Defining the Parameters of Section 1983: Parratt v. Taylor by Gero, Anne L
Boston College Law Review
Volume 23
Issue 4 Number 4 Article 8
7-1-1982
Defining the Parameters of Section 1983: Parratt v.
Taylor
Anne L. Gero
Follow this and additional works at: http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/bclr
Part of the Civil Rights and Discrimination Commons, and the Fourteenth Amendment
Commons
This Casenotes is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School. It has been accepted
for inclusion in Boston College Law Review by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School. For more information,
please contact nick.szydlowski@bc.edu.
Recommended Citation
Anne L. Gero, Defining the Parameters of Section 1983: Parratt v. Taylor, 23 B.C.L. Rev. 1219 (1982),
http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/bclr/vol23/iss4/8
Defining the Parameters of Section 1983: Parratt v. Taylor' — 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 2 prohibits any person acting under color of state law from depriving any
other person of the rights, privileges and immunities secured by the Constitu-
tion and laws of the United States.' For ninety years after its enactment the
statute was rarely used. 4 As a result of three developments, however, the scope
of section 1983 increased dramatically. First, many of the provisions of the Bill
of Rights were held to apply to the states through the fourteenth amendment'
and section 1983 became a vehicle to enforce those expanding rights against
state interference. Second, in its 1961 decision of Monroe v. Pape, 6 the Supreme
Court held that section 1983 governed not only acts of state officials sanctioned
by the state, but also acts which were in violation of state law.' Finally the
Monroe Court further extended the statute's reach by ruling that a section 1983
action was supplementary to remedies provided by the state. 8
451 U.S. 527 (1981).
2
 42 U.S.C. S 1983 (Supp. III 1979).
Section 1983 provides as follows:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be
subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction
thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the
Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in
equity, or other proper proceeding for redress. For purposes of this section, any Act
of Congress applicable exclusively to the District of Columbia shall be considered to
be a statute of the District of Columbia.
42 U.S.C. 5 1983 (Supp. III 1979).
The jurisdictional counterpart of 5 1983 is 28 U.S.C. S 1343(a)(3). Under this section,
federal district courts have original jurisdiction over S 1983 claims with no minimum monetary
requirement. 28 U.S.C. S 1343(a)(3) (Supp. III 1979). Although this article is only concerned
with the protection of constitutional rights afforded by the Act, S 1983 also provides a cause of ac-
tion for violations of federal statutes. See Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1, 4 (1980); Middlesex
County Sewerage Auth. v. National Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453 U.S. 1, 19-21 (1981).
4 Whitman, Constitutional Torts, 79 MieH. L. REV. 5, 5 (1980); Developments in the Law
— Section 1983 and Federalism, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1133, 1169 (1977) [hereinafter cited as
Developments]; Note, Limiting the Section 1983 Action in the Wake of Monroe v. Pape, 82 HARV. L.
REV. 1486, 1486 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Note, Limiting 5 1983].
' The fourteenth amendment currently protects individuals from state interference
with the following federal constitutional rights:
[T]he right to just compensation; the first amendment freedoms of speech, press,
assembly, petition, free exercise of religion and non-establishment of religion; the
fourth amendment rights to be free of unreasonable search and seizure and to ex-
clude from criminal trials evidence illegally seized; the fifth amendment rights to be
free of compelled self incrimination and double jeopardy; the sixth amendment
rights to counsel, to a speedy and public trial before a jury, to an opportunity to con-
front opposing witnesses, and to compulsory process for the purpose of obtaining
favorable witness; and the eighth amendment right to be free of cruel and unusual
punishments.
L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 5 11 -2, at 567 -68 (1978).
6 365 U.S. 167 (1961), overruled in part, Monell v. Department of Social Servs., 436
U.S. 658, 701 (1978) (The Court overruled Monroe on the issue of municipal immunity and held
that a municipal body is not entitled to absolute immunity under 5 1983.).
365 U.S. at 172.
Id. at 183.
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As a result of the broadened scope of the statute, the number of section
1983 claims filed in federal court has increased greatly.° In 1981, in Parratt v.
Taylor," the Supreme Court made a significant attempt to check the prolifera-
tion of section 1983 cases, while ensuring that constitutional rights will con-
tinue to be protected. In so doing, the Parrau Court resolved the questions of
whether negligent deprivations are actionable under section 1983 and whether
postdeprivation hearings may satisfy due process requirements for a negligent
deprivation of property.
The respondent in Pan-att, Bert Taylor, was an inmate in a Nebraska state
prison who ordered hobby materials worth $23.50 by mail." The package ar-
rived at the prison and was signed for by two prison employees, but because he
was in segregation, Taylor was unable to have the hobby kit at that time."
When he was released from segregation, prison officials were unable to locate
the materials or determine what had happened to them." Taylor went through
the prison grievance procedure apparently to no avail." Subsequently, he
brought a section 1983 claim in federal district court against the Warden and
the Hobby Manager of the prison to recover the cost of the materials. 15 Taylor
alleged that as a result of the negligence of the prison officials he was deprived
of his property without due process of law." The district court granted
Taylor's motion for summary judgment reasoning that the negligence of the of-
ficials resulted in a loss of property without due process." The Eighth Circuit
Court of Appeals affirmed the summary judgment" and the United States
Supreme Court granted certiorari."
In an 8-1 decision, 2° the Supreme Court held that although Taylor was
9 The number of civil rights actions filed in federal court, excluding suits by prisoners,
has increased from 296 in 1961, ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS,
1975 ANN. REP. OF THE DIRECTOR 194 [hereinafter cited as 1975 ANN. REP.], to 12,944 in
1980, ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS, 1980 ANN. REP. OF THE
DIRECTOR 70 [hereinafter cited as 1980 ANN. REP.]. Similarly, the number of civil rights actions
filed by state prisoners also has increased greatly from 218 in 1966, 1975 ANN. REP. at 207, to
12,397 in 1980, 1980 ANN. REP. at 62.
IS 451 U.S. 527 (1981).
" Id. at 529.
12 Id. at 530.
" Id.
" Id. at 556 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Id. at 530. The Court has previously held that under S 1983 employers are not liable
for the acts of their employees solely on the basis of the employer-employee relationship. Monell
v. Department of Social Servs., 436 U.S. at 692. In Parratt, however, the petitioners had never
raised this argument in the district court. 451 U.S. at 537 n.3. Therefore, the Parratt Court ac-
cepted the district court's assumption that petitioners themselves were negligent and that this
negligence caused the loss. Id.
16 Id. at 530.
" Taylor v. Parratt, No. 76-L-57 (D. Neb. Oct. 25, 1978).
Taylor v. Parratt, 620 F.2d 307 (8th Cir. 1980).
19 Parratt v. Taylor, 449 U.S. 917 (1980).
The Court's opinion, written by Justice Rehnquist was joined without reservation by
Chief Justice Burger and Justices Brennan and Stevens. Justices Powell, Stewart and Blackmun
concurred in separate opinions with Justice White joining Justice Blackmun's opinion. Justice
Marshall wrote a separate opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part.
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deprived of property by persons acting under color of state law, the negligent
deprivation was not without due process of law. 2 ' The Court recognized that
Nebraska had a state tort remedy which would have adequately compensated
Taylor for the loss of his hobby materials." The Court determined that the
state postdeprivation remedy satisfied the requirements of procedural due
process. 23 Since the postdeprivation state remedy satisfied the constitutional re-
quirements of due process, the Court held that the negligent deprivation of
Taylor's property was not a constitutional violation and therefore Taylor had
no section 1983 cause of action."
The significance of Parratt lies in the impact that the Court's decision will
have on section 1983. Parratt serves to expand the scope of section 1983 by in-
dicating that negligent deprivations of property are actionable under section
1983. At the same time, however, Parratt limits the scope of section 1983 by
holding that a postdeprivation hearing may satisfy fourteenth amendment due
process requirements for deprivations of property. While Parma will deny cer-
tain property deprivation claims a federal forum, the decision continues to pro-
tect property rights by denying a federal forum only when the state post-
deprivation remedy satisfies the requirements of procedural due process. Al-
though the Parratt Court dealt with a negligent deprivation of property, the de-
cision may also have an impact on section 1983 claims based on other constitu-
tional claims, such as intentional deprivations of property and both negligent
and intentional deprivations of life and liberty.
This casenote will examine the Supreme Court's decision in Parratt and its
implication for future section 1983 litigation. The casenote begins with a
description of the background against which Parratt was decided: the conflict
between a federal judiciary overburdened by section 1983 litigation, and the
mandate of the statute to protect constitutional rights. Next, the reasoning of
the Court in Parratt will be described.
The Court's determination of the state of mind required for section 1983
violations will be analyzed. It will be submitted that although the Court failed
to state explicitly whether negligence is actionable under section 1983, the im-
plicit holding of Parratt is that such conduct is actionable under a procedural
due process claim. The casenote then analyzes the Court's decision that the
Nebraska tort remedy satisfied procedural due process for the negligent,
unauthorized deprivation of Taylor's hobby kit. The question of whether a
postdeprivation remedy may satisfy due process requirements for other types of
deprivations will also be addressed. It will be submitted that although a post-
deprivation remedy may satisfy procedural due process requirements for inten-
tional unauthorized deprivations of property, it will generally not satisfy pro-
cedural due process requirements for deprivations of life or liberty. The case-
note also examines the viability of an alternative section 1983 substantive due
I' 451 U.S at 543.
22 Id. at 544.
23 Id.
24 Id. at 543-44.
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process claim. Finally, the casenote will discuss the effect of Parratt on the sec-
tion 1983 caseload, and will suggest an additional approach courts may adopt
in order to limit the number of section 1983 claims without interfering with the
protection of important constitutional rights.
I. THE BACKGROUND OF PARRATT: THE PROLIFERATION OF SECTION 1983
CLAIMS IN FEDERAL COURTS
The significance of the Parratt decision cannot be understood fully unless
the context in which it was decided is examined. The modern federal judiciary
is faced with an ever-increasing caseload, much of it attributable to the pro-
liferation of section 1983 litigation. This section of the casenote will first con-
sider the negative effects that the increasing section 1983 caseload may have on
the federal judiciary. Then it will discuss the importance of section 1983 for the
protection of constitutional rights. Finally, it will examine several approaches
federal courts have used to reduce the number of section 1983 claims litigated
in federal courts.
Courts and commentators have expressed a growing concern over the
negative effects of the increasing section 1983 caseload." Their concerns rest
primarily on four grounds. First, the proliferation of section 1983 cases may be
hindering the ability of federal courts to protect important constitutional
rights." Some commentators have asserted that if judges are pressed for time
in deciding large numbers of section 1983 cases, they may be tempted to look
for easy solutions or defer to the recommendations of clerks. 27 As a result, the
overload of cases may hamper the ability of the federal courts to address ade-
quately each section 1983 claim that comes before it.
The increasing number of section 1983 cases litigated in federal court also
has been viewed as altering the balance of federalism by providing a federal
2! Concern for the increase in the S 1983 caseload has led many commentators to sug-
gest approaches for redefining the scope of 5 1983. See generally, Aldisert, Judicial Expansion of
FederalJurisdiction: A Federal fudge's Thoughts on Section 1983, Comity and the Federal Caseload, 1973 L.
& SOC. ORD. 557 (recommending exhaustion of state remedies for prisoner's claims and
statutory limits on the scope of 5 1983); Kirkpatrick, Defining a Constitutional Tort Under Section
1983: The State of Mind Requirement, 46 DN. L. REV. 45 (1977) (maintaining that the 5 1983 state
of mind requirement should depend on the constitutional provision being enforced); McCor-
mack, Federalism and Section 1983: Limitations on Judicial Enforcement of Constitutional Protections, 60
VA. L. REV. 1 (1974) (emphasizing caution in applying the doctrines of abstention and res
judicata to 5 1983); Nahmod, Section 1983 and the "Background" of Tort Liability, 50 IND. L. J. 5
(1974) (focusing on the elements of the underlying constitutional violation); O'Connor, Trends in
the Relationship Between the Federal and State CoUrts From the Perspective of a State Court Judge, 22 Wm. &
MARY L. REV. 801, 808-10 (1981) (recommending exhaustion of state remedies); Shapo, Con-
stitutional Tort: Monroe v. Pape and the Frontiers Beyond, 60 Nw. U.L. Rev. 277 (1965) (maintain-
ing defendants conduct should be "outrageous" for a valid 5 1983 claim); Whitman, supra note 4
(suggesting modification of the types of relief awarded); Note, Limiting 5 1983, supra note 4
(recommending federal jurisdiction only when the state fails to provide an adequate remedy).
26 See, e.g., Aldisert, supra note 25, at 566; Whitman, supra note 4, at 27; Turner, When
Prisoners Sue: A Study of Prisoner Section .1983 Suits in the Federal Courts, 92 HARV. L. REV. 610, 638
(1979).
" See, e.g. , Whitman, supra note 4, at 27.
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remedy for affairs which were traditionally left to the state. 28 Section 1983 ac-
tions do, after all, interfere with the state regulation of the behavior of its of-
ficials by allowing federal judges to set standards and punish misconduct." In
addition, as section 1983 actions increasingly are brought in federal court,
some commentators fear state courts may become less competent to decide con-
stitutional issues because of their lack of exposure to such claims."
Apart from concerns that section 1983 disrupts the roles of the state and
federal judiciary, it also has been argued that Congress never intended section
1983 to include the types of cases considered within its scope. For example, the
legislative debates prior to the enactment of section 1983" have been inter-
preted as indicating that a section 1983 cause of action should be available only
when the deprivation is authorized by state law or practice" or when the state
fails to provide an adequate remedy." In addition, some commentators assert
that the section 1983 cause of action is being trivialized by allowing claims
which involve very small monetary amounts" or which can be remedied ade-
quately in state court" to be actionable under the statute.
The desire to reduce the section 1983 caseload, however, has not been
considered a sufficient reason to limit the protection of constitutional rights."
Rather, concern for a heavy caseload must be balanced against the general
purpose of section 1983 — to protect important constitutional rights." This
purpose is evidenced by the remedy section 1983 gives an individual whose
constitutional rights have been violated. First, section 1983 provides the in-
" See, e.g., Whitman, supra note 4, at 34-35; Developments, supra note 4 at 1173-75.
29 Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. at 24-42 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting); Whitman, supra
note 4, at 36.
99 Whitman, supra note 4, at 35.
" See CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. (1871).
92 Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. at 236 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
" Id.; See also Note, Limiting 5 1983, supra note 4, at 1491-92.
34 See, e.g. , Aldisert, supra note 25, at 569-70; Burger, Report on the Federal Judicial Branch
— 1973, 59 A.B.A. J. 1125, 1128 (1973); Note, Limiting 5 1983, supra note 4, at 1493.
Since there is no minimum monetary amount required for jurisdiction over a 5 1983
claim, see note 3, supra, courts have generally allowed 5 1983 claims which involve relatively small
monetary amounts. See, e.g., Diamond v. Thompson, 523 F.2d 1201, 1203 (5th Cir. 1975)
($68.35); Russell v. Bodner, 489 F.2d 280, 281 (3d Cir. 1973) (7 packages of cigarettes). Several
courts, however, have denied such claims on the grounds that the claims are frivolous or the
property interests are so de minimus that the deprivation is not a deprivation within the meaning
of the fourteenth amendment. See, e.g., Nickens v. White, 536 F.2d 802, 803 (8th Cir. 1976)
(mail order catalogue); Pitts v. Griffin, 518 F.2d 72, 73 (8th Cir. 1975) (multifrequency radio);
Howard v. Swenson, 426 F.2d 277, 277 (8th Cir. 1970) (several pairs of shoes).
n See, e.g., Aldisert, supra note 25, at 570-71; Note, Limiting 1983, supra note 4, at
1493.
Justice Stevens while sitting as a judge on the Seventh Circuit noted that "[t]he federal
interest in conserving federal judicial resources for litigation in which significant federal ques-
tions are at stake favors a construction of the Civil Rights Act which will not enlarge it to provide
an alternative means of processing ordinary common-law tort claims." Kimbrough v. O'Neil,
523 F.2d 1057, 1066 (7th Cir. 1975) (Stevens, J., concurring), ed en bane, 545 F.2d 1059 (7th
Cir. 1976).
36 See Whitman, supra note 4, at 28.
37
 Id.
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dividual with a cause of action in federal court when he has no cause of action
under state law for the protection of his constitutional rights." Second, even
when state law affords a cause of action, section 1983 provides a supplementary
remedy which allows the individual to litigate his claim in either a federal or
state court." He is then able to decide which forum is best suited to hear his
claim. Finally, the section 1983 remedy serves as a deterrent to constitutional
violations since it allows recovery for punitive damages 40 and reasonable at-
torney's fees" which may be unavailable in state court. 42
Besides providing litigants with maximum protection for violations of
their constitutional rights, section 1983 symbolizes the importance accorded
the protection of constitutional rights in our judicial system." Although the
argument has been raised that the increased scope of section 1983 has altered
the balance of federalism, section 1983 was enacted in order to maintain a
proper federal/state balance by providing a federal cause of action for viola-
tions of constitutional rights committed under color of state law. 44 Section 1983
was enacted after the Civil War where states were unable or unwilling to pro-
tect the constitutional rights of their citizens. 45 By its very terms, section 1983 is
aimed at providing a federal remedy for the violation of constitutional rights by
the states. 46
In a continuing attempt to balance the competing interests of complying
with the mandate of section 1983 to protect constitutional rights and maintain-
ing a manageable caseload, federal courts have been striving to reduce the
number of section 1983 claims without precluding the use of section 1983 for
the protection of constitutional rights." One approach adopted by federal
courts to balance these competing interests involves the use of various restric-
tive procedural devices. For example, courts have applied the doctrines of col-
38 E.g., Carter v. Carlson, 447 F.2d 358, 365 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (officials not subject to
suit at common law due to official immunity), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. District of Columbia
v. Carter, 409 U.S. 418 (1973).
39 Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. at 183.
4° Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 256-57 & n.11, 266 (1978).
41 The Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C. S 1988 (1976).
42
 Most tort remedies do not provide for reasonable attorney's fees, RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS 5 914 (1979), and some tort remedies may not provide for punitive
damages, RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS 5 908 comment f (1979).
43
 Whitman, supra note 4, at 24.
44
 In Mitchum v. Foster, the Court stated "[t]he very purpose of S 1983 was to inter-
pose the federal courts between the States and the people, as guardians of the people's federal
rights — to protect the people from unconstitutional action under color of state law ... "
Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 242 (1972). See also Developments, supra note 4, at 1174-75.
4 ' See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, supra note 31, at 379, 428, 653.
46
 See Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. at .171.
47
 Congress has also taken steps to reduce the number of 5 1983 claims in federal court.
Congress recently passed the Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act, 42 U.S.C. 5 1997e,
which requires federal judges to continue S 1983 claims brought by prisoners for 90 days to allow
all adequate administrative remedies to be exhausted. 42 U. S.C.A. S 1997e (West 1981).
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lateral estoppel," abstention," immunity,." res judicata," and exhaustion." to
section 1983 claims to limit the availability of a federal forum to section 1983
claimants.
Apart from procedural mechanisms, certain substantive doctrines of the
Supreme Court have also played a role in reducing the number of section 1983
claims. The Court's narrow definition of liberty and property interests for pur-
poses of constitutional violations has precluded certain constitutional claims.
For example, the Court has held that damage to reputation does not constitute
4 ' Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90 (1980). In Allen, the Court held that collateral estop-
pel will preclude a S 1983 claim when the state court has given the parties a full and fair oppor-
tunity to litigate the issue. Id. at 96-105. The defendant in Allen had unsuccessfully brought a
state claim for suppression of evidence alleging an illegal search and seizure of drug. Id. at 91. He
then brought a 5 1983 claim in federal court for damages against the officers who had conducted
the search. Id. The Court held that collateral estoppel precluded the federal claim since the de-
fendant had already litigated the issue in state court. Id. at 105.
49 Judice v. Vail, 430 U.S. 327 (1977). The Judice Court held that the doctrine of
abstention prevents federal courts from entertaining a 5 1983 action and interfering in an ongo-
ing state proceeding as long as plaintiffs could have raised the constitutional issues in proceedings
conducted in state court. Id. at 337. In Judice, a state court entered a default judgment against the
appellee. Id. at 329. After the appellee failed to pay the judgment, attend a deposition and appear
at a contempt hearing, the state court found the appellee in contempt of court and he was ar-
rested. Id. at 328-29. The appellee then brought an action in federal court to enjoin the state's
contempt procedures on the grounds that imprisonment for contempt of court violated the four-
teenth amendment. Id. at 329. Recognizing that the appellee had never appeared in the state
court, the Court maintained that the appellee had had the opportunity to present his constitu-
tional claim in the state court proceedings. Id. at 337. The Court therefore held that the doctrine
of abstention required that the appellee's claim in federal court be dismissed. Id.
5° The Court has extended the common law immunity . of state court judges and the
common law good faith and probable cause immunities of officers making arrests to S 1983 ac-
tions. Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 554-55, 557 (1967). The Court has also extended the com-
mon law good faith immunity of school board members and prosecuting attorneys to S 1983 ac-
tions. Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 313-22 (1975) (school board members); Imbler v.
Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 427 (1976) (prosecuting attorneys).
Even though the Court has adopted these common law immunities for 5 1983, these
qualified immunities are more limited than absolute immunities granted by some states. See, e.g. ,
Carter v. Carlson, 447 F.2d at 365.
" Several lower federal courts have held that when a claim has been litigated in state
court a subsequent 5.1983 suit brought in federal court which asserts the same claim will be
barred by the doctrine of res judicata. E.g. , Robbins v. District Court, 592 F.2d 1015, 1018 (8th
Cir. 1979); Scoggin v. Schrunk, 522 F.2d 436, 437 (9th Cir. 1975); Lovely v. Laliberte, 498 F.2d
1261, 1263 (1st Cir. 1974), ctrl. denied, 419 U.S. 1038 (1974); Blankner v. Chicago, 504 F.2d
1037, 1042 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 948 (1975).
In addition, the Supreme Court suggested in Allen v. McCurry that res judicata will
apply to 5 1983 claims. 449 U.S. at 96-100.
52 Several lower federal courts have determined that exhaustion of state administrative
remedies is required as a prerequisite to a 5 1983 action absent any of the traditional exceptions.
See, e.g., Patsy v, Florida Int'l Univ., 634 F.2d 900, 912 (5th Cir. 1981), cm. granted sub nom. , Pat-
sy v. Board of Regents, 102 S.Ct. 88 (1981); Secret v. Brierton, 584 F.2d 823, 831 (7th Cir.
1978); Gonzalez v. Shanker, 533 F.2d 832, 833-34 (2d Cir. 1976). The Ninth Circuit has deter-
mined that exhaustion is only required when a 5 1983 suit is brought to forestall a threatened
future deprivation of civil rights. Canton v. Spokane School Dist. # 81, 498 F.2d 840, 844 (9th
Cir. 1974).
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a deprivation of liberty" and that there is no property right to continued em-
ployment when the employment is terminated pursuant to procedures author-
ized by state law." In addition, the Court's recognition that certain depriva-
tions of constitutional rights may nevertheless satisfy due process requirements
has also narrowed the scope of section 1983 claims. 55 It is the context of this
conflict between the legitimate scope of section 1983 and the burgeoning
federal caseload that the Supreme Court reached its decision in Parratt. 56
II. THE SUPREME COURT'S REASONING IN PARRATT
The Parratt Court held that the Nebraska postdeprivation remedy pro-
vided Taylor with procedural due process for the negligent deprivation of his
hobby kit and therefore Taylor had no section 1983 claim. This section of the
casenote will describe the Court's analysis of whether negligence is actionable
under section 1983. It then will present the Court's reasoning in concluding
that the Nebraska tort remedy provided Taylor with procedural due process for
the deprivation of his property. Finally, it will present the concurring and
dissenting opinions which accompany the decision.
Writing for the Court in Parratt, Justice Rehnquist first considered
whether negligence was actionable under section 1983. 57 The Court noted that
the language of section 1983 and its legislative history do not expressly limit
section 1983 to intentional deprivations." Next, the Court discussed prior
Supreme Court cases which suggested that negligent actions may give rise to a
" Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 712 (1976). While the Court held that damage to
reputation alone did not constitute a deprivation of liberty or property they suggested that
reputation plus some other tangible interest such as employment may be a constitutional viola-
tion. Id. at 701.
54
 Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341, 345-47 (1976). The Court reasoned that since the
city ordinance conditioned the employment upon specific removal procedures the employee had
no entitlement to continued employment. Id. at 345.
55
 Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651 (1977) (A subsequent state tort remedy was ade-
quate procedural due process for the liberty interest implicated by excessive corporal punishment
of public school students. Id. at 672, 682.); Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137 (1977) (Due pro-
cess requirement for a three day deprivation of liberty as a result of a mistaken arrest was satisfied
by an arrest warrant 'issued upon probable cause and defendant had to resort to his state claim for
false imprisonment. Id. at 140-46.).
56 In addition to reducing the number of 5 1983 claims based on constitutional viola-
tions, the Court, in Middlesex County Sewerage Au& , has limited the availability of a 5 1983 cause of
action for violations of federal statutes. 453 U.S. at 19-21. In Middlesex County Sewerage Au& , the
Court held that an individual has no remedy under S 1983 when the federal statute provides com-
prehensive remedies. Id.
57 451 U.S. at 532-35. Although the Court had granted certiorari to two prior cases in
order to resolve whether negligence is actionable under 5 1983, both cases were ultimately decid-
ed on other grounds. In Procunier v. Navarette, 434 U.S. 555 (1973), the Court avoided
deciding the issue by finding that the defendants were entitled to good faith immunity. Id. at
562-66. Similarly, in Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137 (1979), the Court did not have to resolve
the issue since the Court held that the plaintiff was not deprived of his liberty without due proc-
ess. Id. at 145-47.
3' 451 U.S. at 534.
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section 1983 cause of action." Noting that lower courts are divided on the
issue, 6° the Parratt Court stated that it would attempt to provide better guidance
for the lower courts to follow than it had in the past. 61 Then, instead of holding
explicitly that negligent actions can support a section 1983 claim, the Court
maintained that the initial inquiry in any section 1983 claim is whether the ac-
tions complained of were committed under color of state law and whether they
constituted a constitutional violation. 62
After summarily concluding that the prison guards had acted "under col-
or or' state law," the Court turned to whether Taylor had been deprived of
property without due process of law in violation of the fourteenth amendment.
The Court first noted that Taylor had a property interest in his hobby kit."
The Court then stated that the loss of Taylor's hobby kit, even though
negligently caused, constituted a deprivation." Finally, the Court examined
whether the deprivation of the hobby kit occurred without due process of law."
In determining whether the deprivation had occurred with due process of
law, the Court noted that due process requires that the state provide the ag-
grieved individual with the opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and
in a meaningful manner. 67 The Court first examined cases in which hearings
were required prior to deprivations of property." The Court noted that in
those cases the deprivations had been pursuant to established state procedures
and therefore it was possible for the state to anticipate the deprivation and pro-
vide a prior hearing." The Court recognized, however, that the opportunity to
be heard at a meaningful time and manner does not invariably require that a
88 Id. at 534-35 (citing Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961)); Baker v. McCollan, 443
U.S 137 (1979).
60 See infra notes 127-28.
61 451 U.S. at 533-34.
62 451 U.S. at 535.
63
 Id. at 535-36.
64 Id. at 536. The Court pointed out that property interests are defined by state law and
that the petitioners had not contended that Taylor did not have a property interest in the hobby
kit under Nebraska law. Id. at 529 n.1.
65 Id. at 536-37. The petitioners in Parretti argued that Taylor's hobby kit constituted a
de minimus amount and therefore was not a deprivation within the meaning of the fourteenth
amendment. Petitioner's Brief at 12. The Parratt Court apparently did not accept this argument
even though in Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651 (1977), the Court indicated that there is a de
minimus level of imposition with which the Constitution is not concerned. Id. at 674.
66 451 U.S. at 537-44.
67 Id. at 540 (citing Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965)).
68 451 U.S. at 537-38. Those cases cited by the Court which held that notice and oppor-
tunity to be heard are required prior to a deprivation of liberty or property were: Fuentes v.
Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 69 (1972) (repossession of consumer goods); Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535,
543 (1971) (driver's license); Boodie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 382-83 (1971) (access to the
courts in divorce proceedings); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 , 264 (1970) (welfare benefits);
Snidach v. Family Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. 337, 342 (1969) (garnishment of wages); Mullane v.
Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 320 (1950) (settlement of the accounts of a
common trust fund).
69 451 U.S. at 537.
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hearing precede a deprivation of property." Indeed the Court explicitly ex-
amined cases involving emergency seizures of property by the state in which
postdeprivation remedies were found to satisfy procedural due process."
The Parratt Court noted that there were two justifications for finding that a
postdeprivation hearing satisfied procedural due process for emergency seizure
of property." The justifications were the impracticality of the state providing a
hearing prior to the initial deprivation and the availability of a meaningful
determination of liability before the deprivation by the state became final."
The Court found similar justifications in cases involving property lost as a
result of random and unauthorized acts by state officials. 74 The Court reasoned
that in such cases it would be impossible for the state to provide a hearing prior
to the initial deprivation by its officials, and that an adequate state remedy
could provide a meaningful determination of the liability of the state for an un-
just deprivation of property."
Since the loss of Taylor's hobby kit resulted from an unauthorized act of a
state official and therefore a predeprivation hearing was impossible, the Court
examined whether the Nebraska tort remedy provided Taylor with an ade-
quate remedy to satisfy due process requirements.'" The Court noted that the
tort remedy could have fully compensated Taylor for his lost property."
Although the Nebraska tort remedy failed to provide for punitive damages, a
right to trial by jury, or an action against individual state employees, the Court
maintained the tort remedy was sufficient to satisfy the requirements of pro-
cedural due process.'" Even though it may not have provided Taylor with all
the relief he could have obtained under section 1983, because the tort action
could have fully compensated Taylor for his property loss, the remedy provided
procedural due process."
Thus, the plurality opinion in Parratt examined the plaintiff's claim in
terms of whether the negligent deprivation of property was conducted without
7° Id. at 540.
71 Id. at 538-39. Those cases cited by the Court which held that procedural due process
was satisfied by a postdeprivation hearing were: Ewing v. Mytinger & Casselberry, Inc., 339
U.S. 594, 599-600 (1950) (seizure of misbranded drugs); Fahey v. Mallonee, 332 U.S. 245,
253-54 (1947) (appointing a conservator of a bank), Bowles v. Willingham, 321 U.S. 503, 521
(1944) (fixing of rents during wartime); Corn Exch. Bank v. Coler, 280 U.S. 218, 223 (1930)
(seizure of property of deserting husband to support wife and children); McKay v. McInnes, 279
U.S. 820, 820 (1929) (pretrial attachment of property), aff'g 127 Me. 110, 115-17 (1928); Coffin
Bros. & Co. v. Bennett, 277 U.S. 29, 31 (1928) (issuance of executions against debtor
stockholders of a bank); Ownbey v. Morgan, 256 U.S. 94, 112 (1921) (pretrial attachment of
property of a non-resident as security for a judgment); North Am. Cold Storage Co. v. City of
Chicago, 211 U.S. 306, 320 (1908) (seizure of diseased poultry).
72
 451 U.S. at 540-41.
73 Id.
74 Id. at 541.
73 Id.
76 Id. at 543.
" Id. at 544.
" Id. at 543-44.
" Id. at 544.
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due process of law. Because of both the impracticality of providing a predepri-
vation hearing when negligent conduct is involved, and the availability of a
meaningful postdeprivation determination of liability, the Court found the re-
quirements of due process satisfied. So finding, the Court concluded that there
was no fourteenth amendment violation and, therefore, no section 1983 cause
of action." The Court maintained that if it were to accept Taylor's argument
that the deprivation of property was without due process, every alleged injury
negligently inflicted by a state official would be a constitutional violation — a
result, according to the Court, never intended by the framers of the fourteenth
amendment."
Although the Court decided Parrott 8-1, four Justices wrote opinions clari-
fying and criticizing the Court's plurality opinion. 82 In his concurring opinion,
Justice Blackmun, joined by Justice White, presented his understanding of the
narrow reach of the Court's opinion." Justice Blackmun first noted that he
joined the Court's opinion insofar as it applied to deprivations of property but
not to deprivations of life or liberty." Then, he noted that when an intentional
deprivation of property is involved, a subsequent state tort remedy may not
satisfy procedural process requirements." Finally, Justice Blackmun carefully
pointed out that in Parrott the Court addressed only procedural rights and
therefore he did not read the Court's opinion as limiting in any way substantive
rights flowing from the due process clause."
Justice Powell also wrote separately, concurring only in the result." He
maintained that the initial question in Parrott which was ignored by the Court
was whether a negligent deprivation of property can give rise to a fourteenth
amendment due process claim." In addressing this threshold issue, Justice
Powell concluded that a negligent deprivation of property is not a constitu-
tional deprivation within the meaning of the fourteenth amendment." Main-
taining that the word "deprivation" connotes an intentional act," he stated
8° 451 U.S. at 543-44. This approach was first articulated by Judge (now Justice)
Stevens in Bonner v. Coughlin, 517 F.2d 1311, 1319 (7th Cir. 1975) modified en bane, 545 F.2d
565 (7th Cir. 1976) (When the Seventh Circuit considered the case en bane it did not reach the
issue of whether the state remedy provided due process since it held that negligent deprivations
do not give rise to a 5 1983 claim. 545 F.2d at 569.), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 932 (1978). For an
analysis of Bonner see Note, Prisoner Property Deprivations: Section 1983 and the Fourteenth Amendment,
52 [ND. L. J. 257, 262-80 (1976) [hereinafter cited as note, Prisoner Property Deprivations].
" 451 U.S. at 544. The Court stated that such reasoning "would make of the Four-
teenth Amendment a font of tort law to be superimposed upon whatever systems may already be
administered by the States." Id. (quoting Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 701 (1976)).
82 See supra note 20.
" 451 U.S. at 545-46 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
84 Id. at 545..
" Id. at 545-46.
86 Id. at 545.
" Id. at 546-54 (Powell, J., concurring in the result).
88 Id. at 547.
89 Id. at 548.
9° Id.
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that the most reasonable interpretation of the fourteenth amendment would be
to limit due process claims to intentional deprivations."
Justice Powell also asserted that requiring a constitutional deprivation to
consist of an intentional act avoids trivializing section 1983. 92 In his view of its
legislative history, section 1983 was enacted to deter intentional abuses of of-
ficial power rather than negligent ones." Justice Powell maintained that sec-
tion 1983 will continue to be trivialized under the Court's approach since many
cases involving negligent deprivations will continue to be heard under section
1983 where the state fails to provide an adequate tort remedy. 94
Since Justice Powell concluded that a negligent deprivation of property is
not a constitutional violation, he determined that there was no need for the
Court to consider whether the state remedy provided due process." Never-
theless, Justice Powell noted that assuming negligent actions constitute a
deprivation within the meaning of the fourteenth amendment, the state tort
remedy in Parratt would have provided sufficient procedural due process."
Finally, Justice Powell maintained that substantive due process was not an
issue in Parratt since in his view negligent deprivations do not violate substan-
tive guarantees."
In a brief concurring opinion, Justice Stewart, like Justice Powell, stated
that the negligent deprivation of the hobby kit was not a deprivation of prop-
erty within the meaning of the fourteenth amendment." Justice Stewart em-
phasized that holding such a deprivation of property is a constitutional viola-
tion within the meaning of the fourteenth amendment trivializes and distorts
the meaning and intent of the fourteenth amendment. 99 Yet, in maintaining
that the deprivation of the hobby kit was not the kind of deprivation to which
the fourteenth amendment is addressed, Justice Stewart failed to clarify the
basis of his reasoning. He did not state whether all negligent deprivations
should be excluded from the protection of the fourteenth amendment or only
negligent deprivations involving a minimal loss to the individual. If the
deprivation of the hobby kit were a constitutional deprivation, however, Justice
Stewart stated that he would find the Nebraska tort remedy satisfied due proc-
ess requirements.'"
The fourth separate opinion was written by Justice Marshall.'°' He
dissented from the result while concurring with much of Justice Rehnquist's
9 ' Id.
92 Id. at 549.
93 Id. at 549.
99
 Id. at 550-51.
95 Id. at 551-52.
96 Id. at 547 n.1.
97 Id. at 553.
98 Id. at 544 (Stewart, J., concurring).
99 Id. at 545.
100 Id.
Id. at 554-56 (Marshall, J.,.concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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reasoning. 102 Justice Marshall stated that he joined in the Court's opinion to
the extent that it held that negligent conduct is actionable under section
1983. 105 He also agreed that in cases involving negligent deprivations of prop-
erty, an adequate post deprivation state remedy may provide procedural due
process and preclude a section 1983 claim.'" Justice Marshall concluded,
however, that in Parrati there was no adequate state remedy available to
Taylor."' Noting that prisoners have limited access to information about their
legal rights, Marshall maintained that prison officials should have a duty to in-
form prisoners about their remedies under state law.'" According to Justice
Marshall, if state officials fail to inform a prisoner of his state remedies, they
should not be able to assert the availability of the state remedy as a bar to a sec-
tion 1983 claim."' Since there was no indication that the prison officials had in-
formed Taylor that he could have filed a state tort claim, Justice Marshall con-
cluded that there was no adequate remedy to satisfy the fourteenth
amendemnt.'" Therefore, according to Justice Marshall, Taylor was deprived
of his property without due process of law and had a valid section 1983
claim . 1 °9
The Parma Court's plurality opinion was thus joined without reservation
by only four Justices with the remaining Justices joining four separate opin-
ions. The Justices are in disagreement as to whether a negligent deprivation is
actionable under section 1983. Assuming such a deprivation is actionable,
however, all of the concurring opinions agreed with the plurality opinion that
the Nebraska state tort claim satisfied the requirements of procedural due proc-
ess. The dissent, however, argued that the unique facts of Parma meant that the
mere presence of a postdeprivation hearing was insufficient to guarantee due
process. In spite of the disagreement among the Justices, the Parraii decision
clarifies the scope of section 1983. The following section therefore analyzes the
reasoning of Parratt and its implication for the future of section 1983.
III. CLARIFICATION OF THE SCOPE OF SECTION 1983 — STATE OF MIND
AND PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS REQUIREMENTS
In Parrat t, the Court held that when a state official negligently deprives an
individual of property and the state provides an adequate postdeprivation tort
remedy, there is no violation of the procedural due process requirements of the
fourteenth amendment and therefore no basis for a section 1983 claim."° In
reaching its decision, the Court addressed two main issues. The Court first
102 Id. at 556.
103 Id. at 554-55.
104 Id. at 555.
1 ° 3 Id.
108 Id. at 556.
107 Id. at 555-56.
108 Id.
189 See id.
10 451 U.S. at 514.
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considered the state of mind with which a defendant must have acted for a valid
section 1983 claim to exist."' Then the Court addressed what process is due by
the state when an individual is negligently deprived of property by persons act-
ing under color of state law. 112
 This section of the casenote will analyze the
Court's reasoning on each issue. It will then discuss whether the Court's
reasoning on each issue should be limited to negligent deprivations of property
or extended to other types of claims in order to effectuate a balance between
allowing section 1983 claims which protect important constitutional rights and
denying more trivial section 1983 claims which overburden the federal courts.
A. State of Mind
The Parratt Court addressed the issue of whether negligent actions by a
state official can give rise to a section 1983 claim. Previously, in Monroe v.
Pape" 3 and Baker v. McCollan, 114
 the Court suggested that section 1983 did not
require that the defendant act with a specific state of mind. In Monroe the police
intentionally searched the plaintiff's house and detained him at the police sta-
tion in violation of the fourth amendment." 5 Consequently, the plaintiff
brought a section 1983 suit." 6
 Although the state of mind of the defendant was
not at issue,"' the Monroe Court suggested that section 1983 does not require a
specific intent to deprive a person of a federal right."s The Court compared
section 1983 with its criminal counterpart, 18 U.S.C. section 242, and noted
that although section 242 required that state actions be "willful" in order for
criminal penalties to be imposed, the word "willful" does not appear in section
1983." 9 The Court therefore concluded that a specific intent to deprive an in-
dividual of his constitutional rights should not be read into section 1983. 120
In Baker v. McCollan, the Court also suggested that section 1983 does not
require that the defendant act with a particular state of mind and that the ques-
tion of what state of mind is required must be decided separately for each con-
stitutional violation. 12 ' In Baker, the plaintiff alleged that he was deprived of
liberty without due process when he was detained in jail for three days due to a
mistake as to his identity. 122
 The Court found it unnecessary to decide whether
"' Id. at 532-35.
"' Id. at 537-44.
'" 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
"4
 443 U.S. 137 (1979).
"5 365 U.S. at 169.
"6
 Id. at 170.
"' The issue in Monroe was not whether an intent to deprive an individual of a constitu-
tional right was necessary for a 1983 cause of action, but whether state officials acting in viola-
tion of the fourth amendment were acting under color of state law. Id. at 172.
"5
 365 U.S. at 187.
"9 Id.
12° Id. The Court added that "IS 19831 should be read against the background of tort
liability that makes a man responsible for the natural consequences of his actions." Id.
1 " 443 U.S. at 139-40.
122 Id. at 140-41.
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negligence can give rise to a section 1983 claim.'" Rather the Court held that
since the arrest was pursuant to a warrant issued on probable cause, due proc-
ess requirements were satisfied and there was no basis for a section 1983
claim.' 24 Nevertheless, the Court suggested 'that in some instances negligence
may support a section 1983 claim depending upon the particular constitutional
violation being alleged.' 25 The Court maintained that whether negligence is ac-
tionable under section 1983 "may well not be susceptible of a uniform answer
across the entire spectrum of conceivable constitutional violations which might
be the subject of a section 1983 action. „I26
Although the Court in Monroe and Baker suggested that negligence may
give rise to a section 1983 claim, lower courts have split on the issue. While
some circuit courts have held that mere negligence by a state official does not
give rise to a section 1983 claim,'” others have held that negligence may be ac-
tionable under section 1983. 128 The Parratt Court, recognizing the need to pro-
vide better guidance for the lower courts on the relatjonship between
negligence and section 1983, discussed the issue. 129
Although the Parratt Court failed to state explicitly that negligence can give
rise to a section 1983 claim, such a ruling is implicit in the holding of the case.
After citing the language from Baker and Monroe which implied that section
1983 has no state of mind requirement,"° the Court maintained that the initial
inquiry was not whether a negligent deprivation can give rise to a section 1983
claim.'" Instead, the initial question was whether the state official had been
acting under color of state law and whether the conduct of the official had de-
prived the individual of a constitutional rig -ht.'" Yet, by holding that the
Nebraska tort remedy provided procedural due process for the negligent
deprivation, the Court implicitly held that negligence is actionable under sec-
tion 1983 in the context of a procedural due process claim. If negligence is not
actionable under section 1983 there would have been no need to reach the issue
123 Id. at 140.
14 Id. at 145-47.
123 Id. at 139-40. This approach has been suggested by several commentators. Ste, e.g. ,
Kirkpatrick, supra note 25, at 49; Nahmod, supra note 25, at 22-23.
126 443 U.S. at 139-40.
17 Williams v. Kelley, 624 F.2d 695, 698 (5th Cir. 1980); Harper v, Cserr, 544 F.2d
1121, 1124 (1st Cir. 1976); Hampton v. Holmsburg Prison Officials, 546 F.2d 1077, 1081 (3d
Cir. 1976); Bonner v. Coughlin, 545 F.2d 565, 567 (7th Cir. 1976); Williams v. Vincent, 508
F.2d 541, 546 (2d Cir. 1974).
128 Taylor v. Parratt, 620 F.2d 307 (8th Cir. 1980), aff'g, Taylor v, Parratt, No.
76-L-57 (D. Neb. Oct. 25, 1978); Navarette v. Enomoto, 536 F.2d 277, 282 (9th Cir. 1976), rev 'd
on other grounds sub nom. Procunier v. Navarette, 434 U.S. 555 (1978); McCray v. Maryland, 456
F.2d 1, 5, (4th Cir. 1972); Fitzke v. Shappell, 468 F.2d 1072, 1077 & n.7 (6th Cir. 1972); Carter
v. Carlson, 447 F.2d 358, 365 (D.C. Cir. 1971), rev 'd on other grounds sub nom. District of Colum-
bia v. Carter, 409 U.S. 418 (1973).
1 " 451 U.S. at 532-35.
' 30 Id. at 534-35.
121 Id. at at 535.
122 Id.
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of procedural due process or the adequacy of the state remedy. ' 33 By holding
that the Nebraska tort remedy provided procedural due process, the Parratt
Court concluded that a negligent deprivation of property can give rise to a sec-
tion 1983 procedural due process claim, at least in the absence of an adequate
state remedy.
Since the Court's opinion was joined without reservation by only three
Justices other than Justice Rehnquist, 134 it is necessary to consider whether the
view that negligence is actionable under section 1983 is held by a majority of
the Court. In his separate opinion, Justice Blackmun, joined by Justice White,
concurred with the Court's opinion that a negligent deprivation of property
does not rise to the level of a constitutional violation as long as the state pro-
vides an adequate postdeprivation remedy.' 35 Thus, Justices Blackmun and
White appear to be in agreement with the plurality opinion that a negligent
deprivation will be actionable under a section 1983, due process claim when
the state fails to provide an adequate remedy. In addition, Justice Marshall, in
his dissent, explicitly stated that he joined the Court insofar as negligent con-
duct may be actionable under section 1983.' 36 Justices Stewart and Powell, in
separate opinions, however, maintained that the negligent deprivation of the
hobby kit was not a constitutional deprivation.'" While Justice Powell sug-
gested that no negligent actions by state officials should be actionable under
section 1983,'" Justice Stewart left open the possibility that negligent conduct
by a state official may be actionable under section 1983 if a more serious
deprivation of property or a different type of constitutional violation is
alleged.'" Therefore, in examining all of the opinions in Parratt, it appears that
a majority of the Court, consisting of Justices Rehnquist, Burger, Brennan,
Stevens, Blackmun, White and Marshall, agree that negligence is actionable
under section 1983.
Since the holding in Parratt and the division among the Justices indicates
that negligence is actionable under section 1983, the extent to which this view
of section 1983 is consistent with the original purposes of the statute must be
considered. The legislative debates prior to the enactment of section 1983 show
that it was originally passed to deter deprivations of an individual's rights or
privileges under the Constitution which resulted from the failure of the states to
enforce their laws against members of the Ku Klux Klan.'" Although Justice
Powell suggested in his concurrence that section 1983 as enacted referred only
to intentional -abuse of state authority,' 41 the legislative debates prior to the
' 3 ' Powell acknowledges this point in his concurring opinion, 451 U.S. at 551-52
(Powell, J., concurring).
136 See supra note 20.
'" See supra text and notes at notes 83-86.
136 Id. at 554-55.
'3' Id. at 544-46.
136 Id. at 548-49.
, 136 Id. at 544-45.
'" See supra text and notes at notes 99-100.
'4' 451 U.S. at 549.
July 19821
	 CASENOTES	 1235
enactment of section 1983 do not support his view. The debates make reference
to both the intentional' 42 and negligent' 43 failures of the states to enforce their
laws against the Klan. After extensively reviewing the legislative debates, the
Court in Monroe stated:
It is abundantly clear that one reason the legislation was passed was to afford
a federal right in federal courts because, by reason of prejudice, passion,
neglect, intolerance or otherwise, state laws might not be enforced and the
claims of citizens to the enjoyment of rights, privilges and immunities
guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment might be denied by the state
agencies. [emphasis added1 144
Therefore, the implicit holding in Parretti that negligent deprivations are action-
able under section 1983 is consistent with the Court's more general under-
standing of section 1983's original purposes as expressed in Monroe.
Since the Court's decision in Parratt, several lower courts have considered
whether a negligent deprivation of property can support a section 1983 claim.
These courts have interpreted Pan-att as indicating that negligence may be
enough to support a section 1983 claim. 145 Therefore, it appears that the
holding of Parratt, in light of the four separate opinions, has served as a signal to
lower courts that negligence is actionable under section 1983.
B. Due Process
After determining that the negligent loss of Taylor's hobby kit amounted
to a deprivation of property 146 by officials acting under color of state law, 147 the
Pan-au Court considered whether the deprivation occurred without due
process.'" This section will begin with an examination of the Court's reason-
ing in holding that the Nebraska tort remedy provided procedural due process
for the negligent, unauthorized deprivation of Taylor's hobby kit. Next, it will
discuss whether the due process approach taken in Passau should be applied to
intentional unauthorized deprivations of property and to both negligent and in-
tentional deprivations of life and liberty. Finally, this section will examine the
substantive limits which the due process clause imposes on actions of state of-
ficials.
142 See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, supra note 31, at 374 (remarks of Rep. Lowe) ("While
murder is stalking abroad in disguise, while whippings and lynchings and banishment have been
visited upon unoffending American citizens, the local administrations have been found inade-
quate or unwilling to apply the proper corrective.).
1 " See, e.g., id. app., at 153 (remarks of Rep. Garfield) (" [Elven where the laws are just
and equal on their face, yet, by a systematic maladministration of them, or a neglect or refusal to
enforce their provisions, a portion of the people are denied equal protection.).
144
 Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S, at 180.
14 ' See Mills v. Smith, 656 F.2d 337 (8th Cir. 1981) ("[t]he Supreme Court indicated
that negligence may be enough in some cases to support recovery under $ 1983 for lost
property." Id. at 340 n.2); Bonner v. Coughlin, 657 F.2d 931 (7th Cir. 1981) ("[Passau] ap-
parently [will] allow a 1983 claim based upon a negligent deprivation of property by prison
guards." Id. at 933 n.3.).
146
 451 U.S. at 536-37.
142 Id. at 535-36.
146 Id. at 537-44.
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1. The Court's Decision
In Parratt, the Court acknowledged that the fundamental requirement of
procedural due process is that the individual must be provided with the oppor-
tunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner when the
state deprives him of his life, liberty, or property.'" Procedural due process re-
quirements serve two purposes: they protect the individual against erroneous
deprivations by the state,' 5° and they provide the individual with the sense that
the state is treating him in a fair manner."' Due process requirements are flex-
ible"' and both the type of hearing and the point at which it must be provided
depend on what a particular situation requires to protect the individual against
erroneous deprivations by the state."' Generally, when the state is able to pro-
vide the individual with a hearing prior to the deprivation, the Court has
balanced the competing interests of the state and the individual to determine
whether a prior hearing is required and what type of hearing it should be.'"
In Matthews v. Eldridge, 1 S 5
 the Court described three factors to be balanced
in determining what type of hearing must be conducted and at what point it
must be provided.'" The first factor is the private interest affected by the
deprivation.'" The weight given to the individual interest typically varies
depending on the nature of the interest involved and the degree to which the
deprivation affects the individual.'" The second factor consists of the risk of an
erroneous deprivation and the value of additional procedures in reducing that
risk."' The third factor is the governmental interest at stake, including the
1+9 451 U.S. at 540 (citing Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965)). The Court
has recently indicated, however, that procedures other than a hearing may satisfy procedural due
process. In Baker v. McCollan the Court held that an arrest warrant issued upon probable cause
provided due process for an erroneous detention for three days. 443 U.S. at 145-46.
15° Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 81 (1972).
151 Joint Anti-Fascist Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 171-72 (Frankfurter, J., con-
curring).
No better instrument has been devised for arriving at truth than to give a person in
jeopardy of serious loss notice of the case against him and opportunity to meet it.
Nor has a better way been found for generating the feeling, so important to a
popular government, that justice has been done.
Id.; L. TRIBE supra note 5, at 502-03 (1978).
152 Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972).
"9
 Matthews v. Eldrige, 424 U.S. 319, 333-35 (1976). See generally Friendly, Some Kind of
Hearing, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1267 (1975) (discussion of the various forms of hearings that should
be afforded individuals based on the nature of the deprivation).
19+ See, e.g. , Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div. v. Craft, 436 U.S. 1, 17-22 (1978); In-
graham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 675-82 (1977); Matthews v. Eldrige 424 U.S. 319, 335-49
(1976); Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 577-84 (1975); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 260-71
(1970).
155 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
"6 Id.
'' Id.
"a Id. See, e.g., Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1979) (An individual's interest in
avoiding an erroneous termination of welfare benefits weighs heavily since it provides the means
to obtain essential food, clothing, housing and medical care. Id. at 264-65.).
159 424 U.S. at 335. See, e.g., Goss v. Lopez 419 U.S. at 565 (1975) (Allowing a student
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financial and administrative burdens involved in providing the additional safe-
guards.' 6° A balancing of these three factors determines whether the hearing
must precede the deprivation' 62 and to what extent it must resemble a full evi-
dentiary hearing162 in order to satisfy the requirements of procedural due proc-
ess.
Although procedural due process generally requires that a hearing or
other procedural safeguard precede a deprivation of property by the state,'"
under limited circumstances a postdeprivation remedy alone may be sufficient.
As the Court indicated in Parma, a postdeprivation remedy may provide pro-
cedural due process for deprivations of property by the state when it is impossi-
ble or impracticable for the state to provide a hearing or other safeguards prior
to the deprivation.'" For example, when it has been necessary for the state to
act quickly to seize property for the protection of public health and welfare a
prior hearing has not been required.'" The state interest in acting quickly to
safeguard the public has outweighed the risk of an erroneous deprivation and
the interest of the property owner in retaining his property.' 66 Reviewing
emergency seizure cases, the Parratt Court emphasized that since it was imprac-
ticable for the state to provide a hearing prior to an emergency seizure of prop-
erty and the state provided a remedy by which the individual could receive
compensation for his seized property, the postdeprivation remedy satisfied due
process requirements. 167
The justification for holding that a postdeprivation remedy provides pro-
cedural due process for emergency seizures of property also apply when a
deprivation of property results from negligent actions of state officials which
are in violation of established state procedures.'" First, if the state has im-
plemented procedures to safeguard an individual's property and a state official
negligently violates those procedures and thereby deprives an individual of his
property, the state is unable to provide a prior hearing. As long as the official
acts in a truly random and negligent manner the state is unable to intervene
an informal opportunity to present his version of the facts prior to a disciplinary suspension from
school will substantially reduce the risk of an erroneous deprivation. Id. at 583-84.)
160
 424 U.S. at 355. See, e.g., Ingraham v. Wright, 430 . U.S. 651 (1977) (Providing a
hearing before administering a paddling as a disciplinary measure would greatly interfere with
the use of corporal punishment in public schools as a disciplinary measure. Id. at 680-82.).
161 424 U.S. at 333-35. Generally the hearing must be provided at a time when the
deprivation can still be prevented. Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 80-82 (1972). See L. TRIBE,
supra note 5, at 544.
162 Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. at 266-71. Goldberg is the only case in which the Court
has required a hearing closely approximating a judicial trial. Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. at
333.
163 See supra note 161.
1" 451 U.S. at 539.
163 See supra text and note at note 71.
166 E.g. Ewing v. Mytinger & Casselberry, Inc., 339 U.S, 594, 601 (1950); Bowles v.
Willingham, 321 U.S. 503, 520-21 (1944).
1 " 451 U.S. at 538-39.
168 See note, Prisoner Property Deprivations, supra note 80, at 269-70.
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and provide a prior hearing.'" Requiring that a state afford an individual a
hearing prior to a deprivation which the state cannot reasonably anticipate
would impose an impossible standard upon the state. Second, when an in-
dividual is deprived of his property, a pOstdeprivation remedy may be able to
compensate the individual for his loss."°
Application of the Matthews formula confirms the adequacy of a postdepri-
vation hearing in cases like Parratt. The state's interest in avoiding an impossi-
ble requirement of a predeprivation hearing and the availability of a postdepri-
vation remedy to minimize the risk of error outweigh the individual's interest
in preventing a temporary deprivation of his property. As the Court has stated
in the past: "The usual rule has been `[w]here only property rights are in-
volved, mere postponement of the judicial inquiry is not a denial of due proc-
ess, if the opportunity given for ultimate judicial determination of liability is
adequate.' ""' Therefore, as long as the postdeprivation hearing provides for
an adequate determination of the liability of the state for a negligent depriva-
tion of property, the postdeprivation hearing will occur at a meaningful time
and in a meaningful manner.
In order for a postdeprivation hearing to provide an adequate determina-
tion of liability, it appears two requirements must be met. First, procedural
due process requires that an individual be given the opportunity to be heard by
an impartial decision maker. 12 Although several commentators have suggested
The Court recently held in Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 50 U.S.L.W. 4247 (U.S.
Feb. 23, 1982), that a postdeprivation tort remedy did not satisfy procedural due process re-
quirements for a deprivation of property which occurred as a result of an established state pro-
cedure. Id. at 4251. In Logan, the plaintiff filed an employee discrimination claim with the Illinois
Fair Employment Practices Commission. Id. at 4248. The Commission was then required by
statute to provide the plaintiff with a hearing within 120 days. Id. Through the negligence of a
Commission employee the hearing was not scheduled within the required time period. The Com-
mission therefore dismissed the claim. Id. at 4249. In holding that the established state procedure
for dismissing the claim denied the plaintiff procedural due process, the Court noted that once the
state provides a cause of action and an individual files a claim according to the filing procedures,
the individual has a property interest in the cause of action. Id. As a result, the state cannot ter-
minate that property interest without providing the individual with a hearing on the merits of the
claim. Id. at 4250. Since the established state procedure terminated the plaintiff's claim without
providing him with a hearing on the merits, the Court held that the state had deprived the plain-
tiff of his property without due process of law even though the state provided a postdeprivation
tort remedy. Id. at 4251.
In
 If the actions of the official are not truly random the state may be able to predict
when they will occur in order to provide procedures to prevent the deprivation from occurring. If
this is the case, the Matthews balancing formula should be used to determine what procedures the
state must provide in order to meet procedural due process requirements. See infra note 186.
' 7° In Ingraham, Justice Stevens, in a dissenting opinion, suggested that in the property
context a postdeprivation tort remedy may satisfy due process since a damage award can general-
1)7 make the individual completely whole. 430 U.S. at 701. (Steven, J., dissenting).
Recently, Justice Blackmun, in Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., noted that a post-
deprivation tort remedy is not able to satisfy procedural due process requirements for the
deprivation of an individual's property right in a cause of action for employment discrimination.
50 U.S.L.W. at 4251.
'" Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600, 611 (1974) (quoting Phillips v. Commis-
sioner, 283 U.S. 589, 596-97 (1931)).
"2 Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U1S. 134, 197 (1974) (White, J., concurring in part and
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that state court judges possess an inherent bias in favor of state officials and are
therefore reluctant to award damages against them,"s the Supreme Court has
rejected this view.'" As long as a litigant is unable to point to specific reasons
why a state court judge would be biased in deciding a case, a state tort remedy,
such as the one present in Parratt, should be able to satisfy the procedural due
process requirement of an impartial decision maker.'"
In addition to providing a fair opportunity to present one's claim, the
postdeprivation tort remedy should also afford the individual adequate com-
pensation for his loss in order to satisfy procedural due process. A determina-
tion that the state is liable for the loss of property would be meaningless unless
it were accompanied by an appropriate monetary award. Nevertheless, a post-
deprivation tort remedy need not provide the aggrieved individual with as
much relief as he could obtain under section 1983 16 in order to satisfy proce-
dural due process requirements. While section 1983 provides a remedy for con-
stitutional violations, procedural due process merely requires that the state pro-
vide the individual with a meaningful hearing.'" As long as the state provides
a meaningful postdeprivation hearing, procedural due process requirements
are satisfied regardless of whether the relief afforded is equal to that obtainable
under section 1983. Since under the Parratt rationale a constitutional violation
has not occurred if the state provides a meaningful hearing, the scope of relief
section 1983 provides to redress constitutional violations is irrelevant.
While the scope of relief available under the state's postdeprivation hear-
ing need not mirror that of section 1983, the requirement that the hearing be a
meaningful one does mandate that a certain minimum level of relief be
available through the state forum. In Parratt, the Court determined that since
the Nebraska postdeprivation remedy could have fully compensated Taylor for
his property loss, the remedy satisfied due process requirements.'" The Court
held that a remedy which allows the individual to collect the value of the lost
property is sufficient to compensate him fully for the deprivation which he has
suffered. 19 The Court, however, failed to note that the Nebraska tort remedy
dissenting in part).
Since due process only requires that the individual be heard by an impartial decision
maker, the Court in Parratt stated that it is irrelevant whether the postdcprivation hearing is
before the judge or jury. 451 U.S. 544.
"3 See, e.g., Chevingly, Section 1983 Jurisdiction: A Reply, 83 HARV. L. REV. 1352, 1358
(1970); Glennon, Constitutional Liberty and Property: Federal Common Law and Section 1983, 51 S.
CAL. L. REV. 355, 394 (1978); Neuborne The Myth of Parity, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1105, 1127-28
(1977). But see Aldisert, supra note 25, at 558.
14 Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. at 105.
1 " In Mayberry v. Pennsylvania, 400 U.S. 455 (1971), the Court held that when a con-
tempt citation for slandering a judge was issued after a trial, due process required that the subse-
quent contempt hearing be before a judge other than the one who was slandered. Id. at 466.
176 See supra text and notes at notes 40-42.
1 " Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965).
18 451 U.S. at 544. Since due process requires only that the individual be compensated
for an erroneous deprivation, it is irrelevant that the Nebraska remedy provided a cause of action
against the state and not against the offending officials.
179 Id.
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does not allow for the recovery of attorney's fees.'" Even though a tort remedy
may compensate an individual for his lost property, he may have expended
large sums of money in attorney's fees in order to bring the action in state
court. Thus, full compensation for the value of the property may not compen-
sate him for the total loss suffered as a result of ,the actions of state officials.
In the absence of a provision for the award of attorney's fees, then, the
state's postdeprivation hearing cannot truly be said to compensate the in-
dividual fully. In addition, procedural due process should do more than merely
provide the opportunity for an injured party to replenish his resources. The
postdeprivation remedy should convey to the individual the feeling that the
state is treating him justly."' If an individual is required to bear the expense of
litigating his calim in state court after the state has wrongfully deprived him of
his property, it is unlikely that the individual will feel he is being treated fairly.
Because of the importance of fully compensating , the individual as well as
treating him fairly, it is suggested that the due process requirements be con-
sidered satisfied only by postdeprivation remedies which allow a plaintiff who
prevails on the merits of a claim to recover for both the value of lost property
and attorney's fees. 182 It is undoubtedly true that under this approach it would
be rare that a postdeprivation tort remedy would satisfy procedural due process
requirements since most tort remedies do not allow recovery for attorney's
fees. 185 This difference, however, should not be reason to disregard the due
process requirement that the hearing must occur at a meaningful time and in a
meaningful manner.
Although attorney's fees should be required for a postdeprivation remedy
to satisfy procedural due process requirements, punitive damages should not
be considered necessary for a remedy to be adequate. When allowed, punitive
damages supplement compensatory damages and serve to deter further
abuses. 184 As the Parrati Court noted, procedural due process requires only that
the individual be fully compensated for his loss.'" Punitive damages bear no
relation to the individual's loss and therefore should not be a necessary element
for postdeprivation tort remedy to satisfy procedural due process requirements.
In addition to a meaningful determination of liability, procedural due
process may require the state to provide other procedural safeguards to reduce
180 The Nebraska tort remedy provides:
The court rendering a judgment for the claimant under this act, or the State Claims
Board making an award under section 81-8,211, or the Attorney General settling a
claim under section 81-8,218, shall determine and allow reasonable attorneys' fees
and expenses to be paid out of but not in addition to the amount of judgment or
award recovered, to the attorneys representing the claimant.
NEB. REV. STAT. 81-8,228 (Reissue 1976).
' 8' See supra text and note 151.
182 But see Bonner v. Coughlin, 517 F.2d at 1319 n.25 (A state tort remedy satisfies the
fourteenth amendment as long as the "recovery includes compensation for the use as well as the
value of the property.").
' 8' See supra note 42.
1e{
	 (SECOND) OF TORTS 5 908 (1979).
'" 451 U.S. at 544.
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the risk of an erroneous deprivation.' 86 As the Parrott Court noted, however,
Taylor did not contend that the procedures for safeguarding the prisoners' mail
were inadequate or that the state could have provided other procedures to
reduce the risk of the negligent loss of his property.'" If Taylor had raised such
arguments the Court might have applied the Matthews balancing formula to
determine whether the state was required to provide procedural safeguards, in
addition to the postdeprivation remedy, in order to satisfy procedural due pro-
cess. Therefore, although a postdeprivation remedy alone was found to meet
due process requirements in Parrott, if the state is able to provide specific
predeprivation procedures to reduce the risk of an erroneous deprivation of
property, due process may require the state to institute such procedures. 188
Since the Parrott Court relied on the availability of a state remedy to deny
Taylor's section 1983 claim, it is necessary to consider whether Parrott is incon-
sistent with the purpose of section 1983, as interpreted by the Court in Monroe
v. Pape. In Monroe, the Court maintained that section 1983 is a remedy which is
supplementary to whatever remedies are provided by the state.'" The Court
stated: "It is no answer that the state has a law which if enforced would give
relief. The federal remedy is supplementary to the state remedy and the latter
need not be first sought and refused before the federal one is invoked."'" Since
the Court denied Taylor his section 1983 cause of action because of the ex-
istence of a state remedy, Parrott at first glance appears inconsistent with the
Monroe view of section 1983 as a supplementary remedy. Yet, upon a closer ex-
amination, it is evident that the due process approach taken in Parrott does not
conflict with the supplementary role of section 1983. 16 ' In Parratt the Court did
not find that the plaintiff could not pursue a 1983 cause of action simply
' 86 Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 416 ,U.S. 600,-618-20 (1974). In Mitchell, the Court
upheld a Louisiana sequestration statute which provided for a hearing after an individual's prop-
erty was seized. Id. at 619-20. Although the Court had previously struck down similar statutes as
violating due process, North Georgia Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc., 419 U.S. 601, 602-05
(1975); Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 96 (1972); Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp., 395 U.S.
337, 342 (1969), the Court emphasized that the Louisiana statute provided specific predepriva-
tion procedures to minimize the risk of an erroneous deprivation. 416 U.S. at 605-10. The Loui-
siana statute provided for (1) approval of the repossession by a judge, LA. CODE Civ. PROC.
ANN. arts. 281-283 (West 1960); (2) approval only when specific facts were presented indicating
the repossession was justified, id. at art. 3501; (3) a bond furnished by a creditor, id. at arts.
3501, 3574; (4) the opportunity for the debtor to regain possession by furnishing his own bond,
id. at arts. 3507-3508; (5) an immediate post-repossession hearing at which the debtor could ob-
tain compensation for economic and reputational damage as well as attorney's fees if the
repossession proved to be erroneous, it at art. 3506.
The Court balanced the interests of both the creditor and the debtor in the property and
the low risk of a wrongful seizure of property under the statute. 416 U.S. at 607-10. As a result of
this balancing, the Court held that the advance procedural safeguards, in conjunction with a
prompt postdeprivation hearing, satisfied procedural due process requirements. Id. at 618-20.
"7
 451 U.S. at 543.
"B Justice Blackmun noted in his concurrence in Pan-att that "[w]hen it is possible for a
state to institute procedures to contain and direct the intentional actions of its officials, it should
be required as a matter of due process, to do so." Id. at 546 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
189 365 U.S. at 172.
" Id.
11 See note, Prisoner Property Deprivations, supra note 80 at 273-76.
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because a supplementary remedy was available. Rather, the Court found that
the state's postdeprivation remedy satisfied the requirements of procedural due
process. Therefore, since the case involved no constitutional violation, no
viable section 1983 claim existed. By finding no constitutional violation pres-
ent, the Parrott Court avoided any conflict with Monroe's ruling that when con-
stitutional violations do exist, the plaintiff need not pursue available state rem-
edies before employing section 1983. 192
The Panatt Court, then, denied Taylor's section 1983 claim by finding
that he had not been deprived of his property without due process of law. The
holding of Parratt is consistent with prior case law which held that a
postdeprivation remedy can satisfy due process requirements for a deprivation
of property when the state is unable to afford a prior hearing and the
postdeprivation remedy provides a meaningful determination of liability. In
addition, application of the Matthews balancing formula indicates that an ade-
quate postdeprivation remedy satisfies due process requirements for a
negligent loss of property. The Parratt Court, however, failed to consider that
the state tort claim available to Taylor may not have afforded a meaningful
determination of liability since it did not provide for attorney's fees. In spite of
this, by finding that Taylor was not deprived of his property without due proc-
ess of law, the Court denied Taylor's section 1983 claim without interfering
with the role of section 1983 as a supplementary remedy. Since the Parratt
Court denied. Taylor's section 1983 claim based on the availability of a state
postdeprivation remedy, it is necessary to consider whether this approach may
be applied to other types of deprivations in order to preclude them from a sec-
tion 1983 cause of action.
2. Possible Extensions of the Due Process Approach Employed in Parratt
Although the holding of Parratt applies only to negligent, unauthorized
deprivations of property by state officials, some of the language in Justice
Rehnquist's opinion suggests that a postdeprivation remedy may satisfy due
process requirements for other types of deprivations as well. For example,
Justice Rehnquist indicated that the due process approach employed in Parma
may apply to intentional deprivation of property. 193 From an examination of
the separate opinions written in Parratt, it appears that a majority of the Court
192 Several lower courts have interpreted Monroe as indicating that S 1983 is only sup-
plementary to state judicial remedies and therefore require exhaustion of all adequate ad-
ministrative remedies prior to bringing a S 1983 claim. See supra note 124.
193 451 U.S. at 543. The Court described the deprivation of the hobby kit as the result of
an "unauthorized failure ... to follow established state procedure." Id. The Court also referred
to Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651 (1977), which involved an intentional deprivation of liberty
and stated that Parrott was consistent with the approach taken in Ingraham. 451 U.S. at 542-43.
Prior to Parratt lower courts generally held that intentional; unauthorized deprivations
gave rise to a S 1983 claim without considering the availability of a subsequent tort remedy. See,
e.g., Kimbrough v. O'Neill, 523 F.2d 1057, 1059 (7th Cir. 1975), eV en bane, 545 F.2d 1059 (7th
Cir. 1976); Carter v. Estelle, 519 F.2d' 1136, 1136 (5th Cir. 1975).
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would follow this approach.'" Lower courts, however, have divided on the
issue of whether the Parratt due process approach applies to intentional
unauthorized deprivations of property.' 95 In addition, Justice Rehnquist's
opinion suggests that a postdeprivation remedy may provide procedural due
process for deprivations of liberty.' 96 The separate opinions again indicate that
a majority of the Court would agree to extend the due process approach
employed in Parratt to deprivations of liberty.'" A number of lower courts,
however, have divided on this issue as well.' 98 This section of the casenote will
194 Justice Rehnquist was joined without reservation by three other Justices in sug-
gesting that a postdeprivation remedy can satisfy procedural due process requirements for an in-
tentional deprivation. Though Justice Powell did not directly address the issue, he noted that
state tort remedies provide adequate procedural protection for a deprivation of property. 451
U.S. at 547 n. 1. To support his position, Justice Powell cited Ingraham, a case involving an inten-
tional deprivation. Thus, it appears that Justice Powell would allow a postdeprivation remedy to
satisfy due process requirements for an intentional, unauthorized deprivation. Id. Justice
Blackmun, joined by Justice White, explicitly rejected this approach Id. at 545-46. It is unclear
from the opinions written by Justices Stewart and Marshall which position they would take. It
appears therefore that five Justices would be willing to find that a postdeprivation remedy will
meet due process requirements for an intentional unauthorized deprivation.
In addition, Justice Stevens, while sitting as a judge on the Seventh Circuit Court of Ap-
peals, explicitly stated in Kimbrough v. O'Neil, 523 F.2d at 1066, that an intentional, unauthor-
ized deprivation of property should not constitute a violation of the fourteenth amendment as
long as the State provides an adequate remedy. Id. at 1066 (Stevens, J., concurring).
195 Several lower courts have indicated that a postdeprivation remedy may satisfy pro-
cedural due process for an intentional, unauthorized deprivation of property. While one court
has expressly stated that it will follow the Parratt approach for an intentional unauthorized
deprivation, Sheppard v. Moore, 514 F. Supp. 1372, 1375-76 (M.D.N.C. 1981), other courts
have allowed a postdeprivation remedy to satisfy procedural due process without deciding
whether the deprivation was negligent or intentional. See, e.g., Steffen v. Housewright, 665 F.2d
245, 247-48 (8th Cir. 1981).
In spite of the language in Parratt, however, several courts have expressly rejected the
view that a postdeprivation remedy can satisfy procedural due process for an intenational,
unauthorized deprivation of property. Raguesa v. Streaton Police Dept., 530 F. Supp. 814,
816-17 (N.D. 111. 1981); Parker v. Rockefeller, 521 F. Supp. 1013, 1016 (N.D. W. Va. 1981).
195 451 U.S. at 542. The Parma Court noted that its decision was consistent with the ap-
proach previously taken by the Court in Ingraham v. Wright. Id. In Ingraham, the Court, con-
fronted with a deprivation of liberty, held that postdeprivation remedies satisfied due process re-
quirements. 430 U.S. 651, 682 (1977).
197 The Rehnquist opinion was joined without reservation by Chief Justice Burger and
Justices Brennan and Stevens. In addition, Justice Powell, in his separate opinion, referred to In-
graham in stating that a postdeprivation remedy is able to satisfy due process requirements. 451
U.S. at 547 n.1. Thus it appears Justice Powell may also be willing to fmd that a postdeprivation
remedy is able to satisfy due process requirements. Justices Blackmtin and White expressly re-
jected this view, id. at 545, and Justices Stewart and Marshall failed to state how they would
decide the issue.
195 Some courts have held that a postdeprivation tort remedy satisfies procedural due
process for an unauthorized deprivation of a liberty interest. Ellis v. Hamilton, 669 F.2d 510,
515-16 (7th Cir. 1982); Rutledge v. Arizona Bd. of Regents, 660 F.2d 1345, 1352 (9th Cir.
1981); Perry v. Davis, 524 F. Supp. 107, 108 (E.D. Va. 1981).
Other courts have refused to extend Pan-ate to deprivations of liberty. Wakinekona v.
Ofim, 664 F.2d 708, 715 (9th Cir. 1981); Haygood v. Younger, 527 F. Supp. 808, 815 (E.D.
Cal. 1981). Cf. Watson v. McGee, 527 F. Supp. 234, 240-41 (S.D. Ohio 1981) (finding that
plaintiff had a S 1983 claim for a deprivation of liberty without due process without considering
whether a state tort remedy was available).
1244	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW	 [Vol. 23:1219
examine whether a postdeprivation remedy satisfies procedural due process re-
quirements for an intentional unauthorized deprivation of property, and
whether a postdeprivation remedy may satisfy procedural due process re-
quirements for both negligent and intentional, unauthorized deprivations of
life and liberty.
In determining whether a postdeprivation remedy satisfies procedural due
process requirements for an unauthorized deprivation of property, the state of
mind of the offending official should be irrelevant. 192 The appropriate analysis
for an intentional, unauthorized deprivation of property should be, as it is with
negligent deprivations, whether the postdeprivation remedy occurs at a mean-
ingful time and in a meaningful manner. When a state official deliberately
violates established procedures in a random manner and deprives an individual
of his property, it is as impossible for the state to anticipate the intentional
deprivation as it is when an official acts negligently. The individual is no more
deprived of his property as a result of the state of mind of the state officia1. 200 As
long as the state provides compensation for the loss, the postdeprivation rem-
edy arguably occurs at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner. Al-
though an official may be acting intentionally, the official's state of mind
should not alter the due process requirements imposed upon the state for a dep-
rivation of property.
In addition to intentional deprivations of property, the due process ap-
proach utilized in Parratt also may apply to deprivations of life and liberty. In
determining whether a postdeprivation tort remedy satisfies procedural due
process for a deprivation of life, it is apparent that a difference does exist be-
tween a deprivation of life and property. Once an individual has been deprived
of his life, a tort remedy will not occur at a meaningful time. In applying the
Matthews balancing formula, the individual's interest in avoiding an erroneous
deprivation of his life, no matter how small the risk, outweighs the state's in-
terest in not providing a prior hearing. Although the state may be unable to
predict when an unauthorized deprivation of life will occur in order to provide
a prior hearing, an individual's interest in preserving his life is sufficiently
great to find that the deprivation was without due process of law and a section
1983 cause of action exists. Therefore, for a deprivation of life, a postdepriva-
tion tort remedy should never satisfy procedural due process requirements.
Since a postdeprivation remedy will not satisfy procedural due process re-
quirements for a deprivation of life, the remaining question is whether it may
satisfy procedural due process requirements for a deprivation of liberty. The
Court had the opportunity to examine this issue in Ingraham v. Wright. 02 1 The
Court held in Ingraham that a postdeprivation remedy provided sufficient pro-
cedural due process for a deprivation of the liberty interest of public school
students to be free from excessive corporal punishment. 202 In Ingraham, school
199 See note Prisoner Property Deprivations, supra note 80, at 272.
2°0 Id,
2111 430 U.S. 651 (1977).
2 °2 Id. at 682.
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authorities severely paddled several public school students as a disciplinary
measure without providing the students with any type of prior hearing. 203 The
Court recognized that the school authorities were authorized by common law
and statute to administer reasonable corporal punishment for disciplinary
measures204 and that the state provided both criminal and civil penalties
against the school authorities if the punishments were later found excessive. 205
Conceding that the students had a liberty interest in being free from excessive
corporal punishment, 208 the Courts held that the subsequent remedies guar-
anteed that procedural due process requirements were met. 207 In applying the
Matthews balancing formula, the Court noted that although the students had
been severely paddled, 208 the risk of an erroneous 'deprivation was sma11 208 .an'd
a prior hearing would interfere with the use of corporal punishment in public
schools. 21 ° After balancing these factors, the Court held , that a prior hearing
was not required and the subsequent state remedies were adequate for pro-
cedural due process requirements. 2 "
In addition to holding that a postdeprivation remedy may satisfy pro-
cedural due process requirements for a deprivation of liberty in Ingraham, the
Court in Baker v. McCollan held that under some circumstances an ex parte
judicial hearing may be all that is necessary to provide procedural due process
for a deprivation of liberty."' In Baker, the Court held that a deprivation of
liberty for three days did not violate due process when the deprivation occurred
pursuant to a valid arrest warrant."' In Baker, the respondent was arrested and
confined to jail because the warrant intended for his brother contained the
wrong name.'" Although the respondent insisted that the police had arrested
the wrong man, the sheriff-detained the respondent in jail for three days before
checking respondent's story and releasing him. 215 The Court held that even
though the respondent had been deprived of his liberty for three days, the ar-
rest warrant, issued upon a showing of probable cause, provided due process
ms Id. at 656-57.
204 Id. at 674, 676. The Florida statute then in effect authorized public school authorities
to inflict reasonable corporal punishment after consulting with the principal or teacher in charge
of the school. Id. at 655.
703 Id. at 677 & n.45.
2° 6 Id. at 674.
207
	 at 682.
708 One of the students suffered a hematoma which required medical attention and kept
him out of school for several weeks. Id. at 657. Another student was struck on his arms so severe-
- ly that he was deprived of the full use of his arm for a week. Id,
200 Id. at 677-78.
210
	
at 681-82.
2" Id. at 682.
212 443 U.S. at 144-47.
213 Id. at 144-45.
714 Id. at 140-41. Respondent's brother was arrested on narcotics charges and produced
a driver's license containing his picture and the respondent's name. Id. Respondent's brother
was then released on bail under the respondent's name. Id. at 140. The bondsman received an
order allowing him to surrender his principal and a warrant was issued under the respondent's
name. Id.
213 Id.
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for the deprivation. 216 In reaching its decision, the Court emphasized that
respondent's claim amounted to a tort claim for false imprisonment and not a
claim for a constitutional violation. 217 Procedural due process, the Court
found, does not require that the individual be afforded a hearing before or after
the deprivation when he suffers a pretrial detainment of three days pursuant to
a valid arrest warrant. 218 In the Court's view, a probable cause determination
by a neutral magistrate provides adequate protection against an erroneous ar-
rest and pretrial detention. 219 The Court, noted however, that if the detention
had continued for longer than three days in spite of repeated protests of in-
nocence, the arrest warrant may not have satisfied procedural due process re-
quirements. 22°
In light of the holdings in Ingraham and Baker, it is apparent that the Court
is willing to allow postdeprivation remedies, as well as ex parte judicial hear-
ings, to satisfy procedured due process requirements for erroneous deptivations
of liberty by the state. Notwithstanding the holdings of Ingraham and Baker,
however, a postdeprivation remedy may not always provide a hearing at a
meaningful time and in a meaningful manner for a deprivation of liberty. By
its very nature, a deprivation of liberty may cause serious consequences for the
individual. In addition, once the deprivation of liberty occurs, the deprivation
is final and the individual cannot be placed in the same position he was in prior
to the deprivation. 221 As a result, when an individual has been deprived of his
liberty, a monetary award may not sufficiently compensate the individual for
his loss."'
In applying the Matthews balancing formula to determine what process is
2" Id. at 144-45.
217
	 at 142, 144, 145.
2" Id, at 144-47.
219 Id. at 142-43 (citing Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 120 (1975)).
220 Id. at 145. "[D]etention pursuant to a valid warrant but in the face of repeated pro-
tests of innocence will after the lapse of a certain amount of time deprive the accused of 'liberty
... without due process of law.' " Id.
221 Justice White, dissenting in Ingraham, noted that a "student cannot be made whole
[by the state tort remedy] for the infliction of wrongful punishment." 430 U.S. at 696 n.14
(White, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens, also dissenting, stated:
[W]hen only an invasion of a property interest is involved, there is a greater
likelihood that a damages award will make a person completely whole than when an
invasion of the individual's interest in freedom from bodily restraint and punish-
ment has occurred. In the property context, therefore, frequently a postdeprivation
state remedy may be all the process that the fourteenth amendment requires.
Id. at 701 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
222
 In Haygood v. Younger, 527 F. Supp. 808 (E.D. Cal. 1981), the plaintiff was de-
tained in prison 4;4 years longer than was necessary. Id. at 809. In holding that a postdepriva-
tion remedy did not satisfy due process the court stated:
It should go without saying that money is not the equivalent of months of one's life
spent in prison .... Money is compensation for liberty denied; money is not liberty
itself. It seems clear, therefore, that the tort action supplied by the state simply will
not satisfy due process when what was required was the timely release of the plain-
tiff.
Id. at 814.
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required for a deprivation of liberty, it is necessary to weigh not only the risk of
an erroneous deprivation and the interest of the state in providing specific pro-
cedures, but also, the interest of the individual in avoiding the erroneous
deprivation. Therefore, that the state may be unable to provide a prior hearing
should not be a controlling factor. At some point the individual interest will
become so commanding and the risk of an erroneous deprivation so high that
the impossibility of the state providing a prior hearing will not be a sufficient
reason for allowing a postdeprivation remedy to satisfy procedural due process
requirements.
Since the individuals in Ingraham and Baker were deprived of minor liberty
interests, the risk of erroneous deprivations was small and the state had a
strong interest in not providing a prior hearing, a postdeprivation remedy and
an arrest warrant satisfied procedural due process."' If the deprivation has a
more serious impact on the individual, however, courts should be reluctant to
find that a postdeprivation remedy provides due process. Even though the state
may be unable to predict when an unauthorized deprivation of liberty will oc-
cur in order to provide a prior hearing, the state's interest in avoiding an im-
possible standard may not outweigh the individual's interest in retaining his
liberty. Since a postdeprivation remedy may not occur at a meaningful time or
in a meaningful manner for the individual who has been deprived of a liberty
interest, the approach taken in Ingraham and Baker should be limited by lower
courts to apply only when the deprivation is of minor consequence to the in-
dividual.
Although the Court has previously expressed dissatisfaction with a rigid
dichotomy between property rights and personal rights,'" courts would not
have to decide whether a particular interest was a property or a liberty interest
under the approach suggested here. Rather than adhere to a rigid distinction,
courts could deal with life, liberty and property interests on a continuum with
relatively minor property and liberty interests on one end and more serious
liberty interests and life on the other end. Courts would then be free to apply
the Matthews balancing formula, without having to decide whether a particular
interest is categorized as a property or liberty interest. Although placing in-
dividual interests on a continuum may not be an easy task, it will enable the
court to determine what constitutes a meaningful hearing in a given situation
225 See supra text and notes at notes 201-20.
224 As the Court stated in Lynch . v. Household Fin. Corp., 405 U.S. 538 (1972), the
distinction between property and personal interests is not a clear one. Id. at 551-52. In Lynch, the
Court rejected any distinction between liberty and property interests for purposes of federal
jurisdiction under SS 1983 and 1343(3). Id. at 542. In rejecting this distinction, the Court noted
the difficulty in determining whether a particular interest is a property or a liberty interest,
stating:
[T]he dichotomy between personal liberties and property rights is a false one. Prop-
erty does not have rights. People have rights . In fact, a fundamental interde-
pendence exists between the personal right to liberty and the personal right to prop-
erty. Neither could have meaning without the other.
Id. at 552.
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without being constrained by distinctions between liberty and property in-
terests.
The reasoning of Parrall, then, may be applied to more than just negligent
deprivations of property by the state. A close examination of due process re-
quirements indicates that for an intentional unauthorized deprivation of prop-
erty by the state, a postdeprivation remedy may also provide procedural due
process. For deprivations of life and serious deprivations of liberty, however,
the availability of a state tort claim should not satisfy due process re-
quirements. It is suggested that courts adopt a continuum approach and decide
whether a postdeprivation remedy provides procedural due process for an
unauthorized deprivation based on the importance to the individual of
avoiding an erroneous deprivation of the particular interest at stake. Even if
courts do find that procedural due process requirements have been satisfied,
they must still address whether the deprivation has violated any of the substan-
tive due process rights guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment.
3. Substantive Due Process
In addition to imposing procedural requirements on the state when it
deprives an individual of his life, liberty or property, the due process clause
may impost substantive limits as well.'" Therefore, although a postdeprivation
remedy may satisfy procedural due process requirements for a authorized
deprivation of liberty or property, the individual may still have a section 1983
due process claim for a violation of his substantive rights. Substantive due
process protects certain fundamental rights of the individual against in-
terference by the state regardless of whether the state provides a hearing, unless
the state has a compelling reason to intrude.'" Substantive due process
guarantees include the right to engage in activities related to abortion, 227 con-
traception, 228
 marriage, "9
 divorce, 230
 child rearing and education,"' and fami-
ly relationships. 232
 In addition to these specific rights, substantive due process
also protects individuals against deprivations by the state which "shock the
conscience" or are "offensive to human dignity" in spite of any procedures the
state may provide."'
The difference between a substantive and procedural due process analysis
for section 1983 purposes is well illustrated in the Supreme Court's decision in
Ingraham v. Wright. In Ingraham, the Court held that a postdeprivation remedy
225 See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152-53 (1972).
"6 Id. at 155.
227 Id. at 154.
228
 Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453-54 (1972).
229
 Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967).
239
 Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 380-81 (1971).
2" Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925),
232
 Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 49, 502-06 (1977).
2" Rochin v. California, 342 U.S, 165, 172, 174 (1952) (seizure of illegal drugs by
means of stomach pumping violated substantive due process).
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provided procedural due process for excessive corporal punishment in schools,
but explicitly did not address whether any substantive rights under the due
process clause had been violated. 234 The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals
subsequently acknowledged that the infliction of excessive corporal punish-
ment may constitute a violation of substantive due process guarantees. 235 It is
therefore submitted that when a state official acts without a compelling reason
and takes an individual's life, detains him for a prolonged period of time, 236 or
subjects him to excessive physical force without a compelling reason, 237 the
state may have violated the individual's substantive due process rights even if
the state has provided adequate procedures pursuant to the deprivation. 2"
Although a postdeprivation tort remedy was sufficient to insure procedural due
process under Parratt, certain deprivations may be so offensive as to amount to
a violation of the individual's substantive due process rights 239 and a section
1983 claim would exist.
In summary, Parratt will aid lower courts in defining the boundaries of a
section 1983 cause of action both in terms of what state of mind the offending
state official must possess and what types of procedures will satisfy procedural
due process. In light of Parratt it is apparent that negligent actions by state of-
ficials may be actionable under section 1983. Parratt has also made it clear that
an adequate postdeprivation remedy may preclude a section 1983 claim for an
unauthorized deprivation of liberty. Even when procedural due process is
satisfied, however, a section 1983 claim may still be available based on a viola-
tion of substantive due process rights. Although Parretti helps to clarify the
parameters of section 1983 it is necessary to examine whether Parratt will ex-
clude a substantial number of section 1983 claims from federal court.
IV. IMPLICATION OF PARRATT FOR SECTION 1983
The Court's decision in Parratt serves simultaneously to expand and limit
the role of section 1983. In order to examine the impact of Parratt, this section of
234
 430 U.S. at 682. The Court in Ingraham took care to point out that they were not
deciding "whether or under what circumstances corporal punishment of a public school child
may give rise to an independent federal cause of action to vindicate substantive rights under the
due process clause." 430 U.S. at 697 n.47.
"8 Hall v. Tawney, 621 F.2d 607, 614 (4th Cir. 1980).
236 See discussion of Haygood v. Younger supra at note 222.
23'
	
Jenkins v. Averette, 424 F.2d 1228, 1232 (4th Cir. 1970); Johnson v. Glick, 481
F.2d 1028, 1033 (3d Cir. 1973), cert. denied sub nom. John v. Johnson, 414 U.S. 1033 (1974);
Bellows v. Dainack, 555 F.2d 1105, 1106-07 (2d Cir. 1977).
238 Judge Swygert, in his concurring opinion in Kimbrough v. O'Neil, suggested that an
intentional taking of property by a state official without justification also violates substantive due
process. 523 F.2d at 1061.
239 Justice Powell, in his concurring opinion in Parratt, maintained that an unauthorized
deprivation by a state official would have to be intentional in order to violate substantive due
process rights. 451 U.S. 553. Although most unauthorized deprivations would have to be inten-
tional to be so offensive as to "shock the conscience" a deprivation which results from gross
negligence may "shock the conscience" as well and thus would constitute a violation of substan-
tive due process.
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the casenote will first examine the effect the decision is likely to have on the sec-
tion 1983 caseload. Then, the casenote suggests an additional approach which
courts may use to further limit the number of section 1983 claims while pre-
serving the statute's purpose of protecting constitutional rights.
Since lower courts were divided on the question of whether negligence is
actionable under section 1983, 240 the Parrott Court clarified the issues by im-
plicity holding that negligent deprivations of property by state officials are ac-
tionable under section 1983. As a result, many procedural due process claims
involving negligent deprivations which were previously excluded from section
1983 will be heard in federal court. Since the language in both Monroe and Baker
suggested that negligence was actionable under section 1983, 24 ' Parratt, in
determining that a negligent deprivation is a constitutional violation, serves to
expand the role of section 1983 in a manner which is consistent with prior
cases.
Although Parrott expands 1983 by implicity holding that negligent actions
can give rise to a section 1983 claim, Parrott should not be interpreted as in-
dicating that negligence will support a section 1983 claim for all constitutional
violations. Whether a section 1983 cause of action exists will depend on the
particular constitutional violation alleged. While Parratt held that 1983 has no
state of mind requirement, the constitutional provisions actionable under the
statute may require that the defendant act with a specific intent.'" Parrott in-
dicated that a negligent deprivation of property constitutes a violation of the
fourteenth amendment procedural due process guarantees. The Court has
held, however, that the equal protection clause and the eighth amendment pro-
hibition against cruel and unusual punishment require an intentional act by a
state official in order to be actionable. 2" It is an open question ,whether
negligence will suffice for other constitutional violations. 244
Although Pan-att increases the scope of section 1983, the decision
simultaneously limits the number of claims which can come under section
1-983. While the Court found no state of mind requirement for section 1983
claims, it also held that an adequate postdeprivation tort remedy satisfies pro-
2" See supra notes 144-145.
241 See supra text and notes at notes 127-28.
242 The Court in Baker v. McCollan noted that:
the State of mind of the defendant may be relevant on the issue of whether a con-
stitutional violation has occurred in the first place, quite apart from the issue of
whether 5 1983 contains some additional qualification of that nature before a de-
fendant may be held to respond in damages under its provisions.
443 U.S. at n.l.
242 Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 234-42 (1976) (proof of discriminatory purpose
is required for an equal protection claim); Estelle v. Gambel, 429 U.S. 97, 105 (1976) (deliberate
indifference to a prisoner's illness or injury is required for a claim of cruel and unusual punish-
ment).
2" For example, the question still remains open as to what state of mind will be required
for a violation of substantive due process. Justice Powell, in his concurrence in Parratt suggests
that negligent actions should not give rise to a substantive due process claim. 451 U.S. at 553
(Powell, J., concurring in the result).
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cedural due process for a negligent, unauthorized deprivation of property by
state officials. As a result of the Parratt decision, federal courts have denied a
numbers section 1983 claims on the grounds that the state remedy satisfies due
process requirements. 215
 The overall effect of Parratt therefore probably will be
a reduction in the number of section 1983 claims.
Nevertheless, the Parratt decision may not alleviate the section 1983
caseload to any great extent. 246 First, an adequate postdeprivation remedy will
only preclude a section 1983 cause of action when the claimant is alleging a
violation of his right to procedural due process. The challenged conduct may
violate other constitutional rights which would give rise to a section 1983
claim. 247 Second, a postdeprivation remedy will satisfy procedural due process
only when it is impossible or impracticable for the state to provide a hearing or
other procedures prior to the deprivation to preclude the risk of an erroneous
deprivation. Third, there will be instances when the state provides no cause of
action for the claimant248 or when the state's postdeprivation remedy is inade-
quate for procedural due process requirements and therefore a section 1983
claim will exist. The state remedy will inadequate for precluding a section 1983
claim when the state remedy does not fully compensate the claimant for his
loss249
 or when it can be shown that the state remedy, although adequate in
theory, is inadequate in practice."° Therefore, although Parratt may signify an
attempt by the Court to reduce the number of section 1983 claims, many will
continue to be heard in federal court.
Although the procedural due process approach adopted in Parratt will ex-
clude certain section 1983 claims which involve no constitutional violations,
courts may continue to seek additional ways of preventing section 1983 from
encompassing ordinary tort claims. As the Parratt Court observed, the two
245 E.g., Fiallo v. DeBatista, 666 F.2d 729, 733 (1st Cir. 1981); Steffen v. Housewright,
665 F.2d 245, 247-48 (8th Cir. 1981); Franklin v. Oregon, 662 F.2d 1337, 1345 (9th Cir. 1981);
Rutledge v. Arizona, 660 F.2d 1345, 1352 (9th Cir. 1981); Graham v. Mitchell, 529 F. Supp.
622, 624-25 (E.D. Va. 1982).
246 [Djespite the breadth of state tort remedies [due process] claims will be more
numerous than might at first be supposed." 451 U.S. at 550-51. (Powell, J., concurring in the
result).
247 For example, a deprivation of property or liberty may also give rise to a violation of
fourteenth amendment substantive due process guarantees, see supra text and notes at notes
225-39; first amendment rights, see Nickens v. White, 536 F.2d 802, 804 (8th Cir. 1976); fourth
amendment rights, Bonner v. Coughlin, 517 F.2d at 1317; or eighth amendment rights, Finney
v. Arkansas Bd. of Correction, 505 F.2d 194, 207-08 (8th Cir. 1974).
2" See, e.g., Carter v. Carlson, 447 F.2d 358, 365 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (official immunity
under common law), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. District of Columbia v. Carter, 409 U.S. 418
(1973); Kent v. Prasse, 385 F.2d 406, 407 (3d Cir. 1967) (no remedy provided by the state).
249 This would occur if the state has a limitation of liability which bars complete recovery
by the plaintiff. Also under the approach suggested earlier it would occur when the remedy fails
to provide recovery for attorney's fees.
259 It may be difficult to determine whether a state remedy is inadequate in practice. An
example of this would be the tort remedy in Ingraham since there had never been a case brought
under the statute providing for a civil cause of action against teacher for excessive corporal
punishment. 430 U.S. at 694 n.11.
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elements of any section 1983 claim are whether a constitutional violation has
occurred and whether, it was committed by a person acting "under color of '
state lAw. 25 ' It is therefore suggested that an appropriate analysis of the phrase
"under color of state law may aid courts in further defining the appropriate
scope of section 1983.
In Parrott, the Court did not need to explore the scope of the requirement
that state officials must act "under color of" state law for a section 1983 claim
since the Prison Warden and Hobby Manager possessed considerable authori-
ty,in the prison. 252 A clarification of the meaning of the phrase, however, may
alleviate some of the grounds for the Court's concern that section 1983 is
becoming a "font of tort law." 253 The Court has frequently emphasized the
need to place appropriate limits on section 1983. 251 To highlight the types of
trivial 'situation that section 1983 could cover, the Court has maintaind that
unless the statute is limited appropriately an individual whose property has
been damaged by a police officer negligently driving his automobile could have
a cause of action under section 1983. 255 The Court's desire to prevent such
deprivations from being actionable under section 1983 can be accomplished by
a resonable construction of "under color of ' state law.
Originally, "under color or' state law was interpreted to mean that sec-
tion 1983 only applied to actions of state officials which were authorized by
state law. 256 Then, in Monroe v. Pape, the Court extended section 1983 to apply
to actions of state officials which were in violation of state law as wel1. 257 In
Monroe, thirteen police officers, without warrants, broke into the petitioner's
home in the early morning, ransacked his house, took him to the police station,
and interrogated him for ten hours. 259 In determing that the officers had acted
under color of state law for purposes of section 1983, the Court adopted the
meaning it had previously given "under color of ' in 18 U.S.C. 242, 259 the
criminal counterpart of section 1983. 260
 The Court ruled that actions of officials
are "under color of ' state law when they are based on "misuse of power, pos-
sessed by virtue of state law and made possible only because the wrongdoer is
clothed with the authority of state law. " 261 Since the policemen in Monroe were
able to violate the petitioner's rights by virtue of their authority as policemen,
they were acting "under color of state law and therefore both the individual
officers and the City of Chicago could be held liable under section 1983. 262
25 ' 451 U.S. at 535.
252 Id. at 535-36.
255
	 U.S. at 544; Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 701 (1976).
254
 451 U.S. at 544; Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. at 698.
"' 451 U.S. at 544; Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. at 698.
256 Developments, supra note 4, at 1160 & n.138.
2" 365 U.S. at 172.
259
 Id. at 169.
259
 18 U.S.C. 4 242 (1976).
260 365 U.S. at 187. See, e.g., Williams v. United States, 341 U.S. 97, 99-100 (1951);
Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 109-12 (1945); United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 326
(1941).
261
	
U.S. at 184 (citing United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. at 326.).
262 365 U.S. at 187. The complaint against the City of Chicago was dismissed, however,
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Based on the definition given to "under color or state law in Monroe, a
distinction can be drawn between actions of state officials which should give
rise to a tort claim and those which should give rise to a section 1983 claim for
violation of a constitutional right. It is only when an official is able to inflict
harm by virtue of his position of authority that a section 1983 cause of action
should be available. When an official causes harm in a way which is equally
available to a private citizen the act should not be viewed as "under color of
state law. A state tort action should be the only appropriate remedy. 263 For ex-
ample, if a policeman negligently passes through a stop sign and damages
another car, he should be treated as a private citizen: His position of authority
does not make it more likely that this type of harm will occur than if he were a
private citizen. Yet, if a policeman is involved in a high speed chase, his actions
should be viewed as "under color of" state law since it is by virtue of his posi-
tion that he is more likely to be involved in this type of activity. Under this ap-
proach, all harms inflicted by prison officials would be "under color of ' state
law , 264 By virtue of their authority, prison officials are in a position to deprive
prisoners of their property. A taking of a prisoner's property is not the type of
harm which could be inflicted by a private citizen. Following this approach, the
Court's fear that "any party who is involved in nothing more than an
automobile accident with a state official could allege a constitutional violation
under 1983" 265 would be unfounded.
Defining "under color of" state law to include only official actions made
possible by virtue of a position of authority would be consistent with the pur-
poses of section 1983. The legislative debates prior to the enactment of section
1983 indicate that Congress wanted to provide a federal remedy for abuses of
state power. 266 Various legislators expressed their concerns that state officials
were failing to enforce state laws against members of the Ku Klux Klan. 267 The
ability to enforce state laws depends on the authority which state officials
possess; an ordinary citizen does not have the authority to enforce them.
Nothing in the debates suggests that Congress intended section 1983 to reach
conduct of state officials that did not depend upon their position of authority.
The Court has increasingly expressed its concern that the purpose of sec-
tion 1983 is to protect constitutional rights and not to provide a tort action for
all injuries inflicted by state officials.'" By requiring an act to be accomplished
by virtue of the official's authority to be "under color of ' state law, lower
based on municipal immunity under S 1983. Id. at 191-92. Municipal immunity was subsequent-
ly overruled in Monell v. Department of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978).
263 451 U.S. at 552 n.10 (Powell, J., concurring in the result); Bonner v. Coughlin, 545
F.2d at 574-75 (Swygert, J., dissenting); Whitman, supra note 5, at 33 n.144.
264 Contra Kimbrough v. O'Neil, 545 F.2d at 575 (Swygert, J., dissenting). The actions
of prison officials, according to Judge Swygert, can be divided into two categories: those which
are inherently governmental such as providing security and discipline and those which are purely
custodial such as supplying food. Id. Swygery suggests that only the former should be viewed as
"under color of" state law. Id.
263 451 U.S. at 544.
266 Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. at 180.
267 Id.
263 See, e.g., Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. at 146; Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. at 700-01.
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courts can prevent section 1983 from becoming a cause of action which encom-
passes all wrongful acts committed by state officials. If courts employ the sug-
gested approach in order to determine which actions are committed "under
color of" state law, section 1983 will remain available only for those acts which
Congress intended it to apply — those which involve abuse of state authority.
The impact of the Parrott decision will be a reduction in the section 1983
caseload. Although Parrott serves to expand the scope of section 1983 by im-
plicitly holding that negligent deprivations are actionable, the decision
simultaneously reduces the scope of the statute by finding that a postdepriva-
tion remedy may satisfy procedural due process requirements for an unauthor-
ized deprivation by the state. In spite of the holding of Parratt, however, many
due process cases will continue to be heard under section 1983 if the
postdeprivation remedy fails to satisfy procedural due process requirements or
if a violation of substantive due process rights is alleged. Therefore, in addition
to the due process approach adopted by the Parratt Court, a proper construction
of the "under color of" state law requirement may be a useful approach in the
continuing attempt by courts to prevent section 1983 from developing into a
cause of action which encompasses ordinary tort claims.
CONCLUSION
Prior to Parratt, federal courts were overburdened by an increasing section
1983 caseload and were divided on whether negligence was actionable under
the statute. Then, in Parratt, the Supreme Court clarified the scope of section
1983 by implicitly holding that negligence is actionable under a section 1983
procedural due process claim. More significantly, the Parratt Court held that a
postdeprivation hearing can satisfy the procedural due process requirements of
the fourteenth amendment and therefore preclude a section 1983 claim.
The Parratt Court, however, left open the question of whether postdepriva-
tion remedies also can satisfy procedural due process requirements for inten-
tional deprivations of property and deprivations of life and liberty. For an in-.
tentional deprivation of property the state of mind of the defendant should be
irrelevant and a postdeprivation remedy should satisfy procedural due process
guarantees. A postdeprivation remedy, however, can never meet .due process
requirements for a deprivation of life. While a postdeprivation remedy may
satisfy procedural due process requirements for a deprivation of liberty, courts
should consider carefully the serious consequences of an erroneous deprivation
of liberty. Since an individual can never be compensated adequately for a
deprivation of liberty, a postdeprivation remedy should only satisfy procedural
due process requirements for minor liberty deprivations. Assuming that a court
does find that a state tort remedy satisfies procedural due process guarantees,
the court must consider whether the deprivation violated the substantive due
process guarantees of the fourteenth amendment. If substantive due process
guarantees have been violated, the individual will have a section 1983 claim
regardless of the existence of state remedies.
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Although the Parratt decision will preclude certain claims from section
1983, the section 1983 caseload will continue to burden the federal judiciary. In
the aftermath of Parratt, it is clear that any attempts to reduce the scope of sec-
tion 1983 should focus on whether the conduct complained of violated a con-
stitutional provision and whether it was committed "under color or ' state law.
Therefore, in addition to focusing on the elements of the underlying constitu-
tional violation, courts should also look to the requirement that an act be com-
mitted "under color of state law in order to prevent section 1983 from
developing into a cause of action for ordinary tort claims. Although the
burgeoning section 1983 caseload is cause for concern, the desire to reduce the
caseload must be balanced with the mandate of section 1983 — to protect con-
stitutional rights.
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